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Information Wars and the Challenges




We are in the midst of a fundamental conflict in law and policy
between those who favor maintaining and expanding copyright and
related rights in the digital context ("rights enhancers"), and those who
favor letting rights atrophy ("rights restrictors'). This Article argues
that strong intellectual property rights are essential. At minimum, they
are important to support creativity in contexts where the creation,
collection, or distribution of the content requires substantial investment
of time and resources. The case for allowing creators' rights to weaken
is both untested and structurally suspect. Copyright law must
construct a balance that fully supports creative activity of high-quality
and high-investment works. An aggressive weak rights position fails to
do that.
While copyright law in the United States is often associated
with providing incentives to create and distribute works, its
substantive content also plays an important role in setting social norms
about whether copying the work of another is appropriate. A weak
rights regime poorly serves this function-at least if we believe that
creative authors should have some control over use of their works.
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As to incentives, reduced rights are conducive to supporting low
(or no) cost works that often borrow heavily from the works of others.
Strong rights are conducive to works that require significant
investments or a need to recoup the investment of time or resources. In
addition, weak rights on the Internet shift value from all content
creators to corporate aggregators or search engines, not simply to end
users. But a legal system that undermines the incentive to produce and
distribute higher-cost content weakens the entire structure of the
information society.
The policy conflict and the digital context makes copyright an
unstable means of protecting distributed informational works.
Information providers have turned to other laws to enhance
commercialization of their works and these alternatives are and should
be supported in law. This Article discusses two: contractual licenses
and access controls under the DMCA. As to both, many rights
restrictors argue that contracts or technology should not be permitted
to alter the weak rights balance they believe should apply under
copyright law. Courts properly reject these arguments-and rightly so.
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Amid the information explosion created by Internet and digital
technologies, many traditional information industries are under
stress. We are in the midst of what may be a failure of the newspaper
industry and significant economic pressure is being felt in the book
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publishing, traditional bookstores, music, and other content
industries.'
Some of this economic pressure stems from the adjustments
that rapidly changing technology fosters. But it would be an over-
simplification to suggest that all of the pressure comes from
technological change or that continued evolution in technologies will
cure it.2 Fundamental public policy and related legal issues are at
work here that, unless properly managed, may yield a legal structure
incapable of supporting content industries even remotely the scope
and depth of those that currently exist. The Internet has created an
upsurge in the amount of raw information available to individuals,
governments, and businesses and removed many barriers to
disseminating expressive works. But in this environment, perhaps
more than ever, those who shape law and policy need to pay close
attention to providing and maintaining a legal structure that supports
information content industries that can generate the investment and
maintain the resources often necessary to ensure quality in at least
part of the information content distributed.
A conflict in modern law and policy exists between those who
favor maintaining and expanding copyright and related rights in the
modern digital context ("rights enhancers"), and those who favor
letting rights atrophy through an inability to effectively enforce them
or by reducing them through legislation or court decisions ("rights
restrictors").3 I argue that strong intellectual property rights adapted
1. See Richard Posner, The Future of Newspapers, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (June 23,
2009, 7:37 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2009/06/the-future-of-newspapers--
posner.html (discussing the accelerating decline of the newspaper industry and print
journalism).
2. Compare Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
653, 746-50 (2005) (contending that new technology has challenged the existing business model),
with LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW To
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 298 (2004) ("The 'problem' with file sharing-to
the extent there is a real problem-is a problem that will increasingly disappear as it becomes
easier to connect to the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy makers today
to be 'solving' this problem in light of a technology that will be gone tomorrow. The question
should not be how to regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve that
problem away)."). The fact that some of the economic stress comes from the mere fact of
technological change can hardly be contested, but the premise that the changes in technology do
not warrant responses in law or policy to protect investment-based content industries reflects a
Pollyanna approach to the modern context and a simple pronouncement of a weak rights posture
for the digital era.
3. These terms capture a conflict that has been noted in different language by other
writers. See, e.g., MARK HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM 33 (2009) (criticizing rights-restrictors and
commenting: 'Make no mistake about this. They may protest that they are not against copyright
itself but rather its abuses, extensions, and unnecessary inconveniences. This is an unartful
dodge. Not only the persistent undercurrents of the logic and commentary, but their
unselfconsciously expressed arguments show their true colors."); James V. DeLong, Defending
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to the modern digital environment are essential. At minimum, they
are important to support work in those contexts where the creation,
collection, or distribution of informational content requires substantial
investment of time and resources. The case for strong intellectual
property rights in those contexts is grounded in the reality of how
costly such works are to create; it is also supported by the reality that
content creation and distribution thrived when rights were being
reinforced to reflect the developing digital systems.4  The case for
allowing creators' rights to weaken is both untested and structurally
suspect as to these types of informational works. The creation and
enforcement of intellectual property rights entails finding a balance
among competing interests, but that balance has historically favored
support for the creative enterprise, with accommodation for the fact
that aspects of prior works (ideas, small portions, and the like) may
provide a basis for new works.5 Copyright law must construct and
maintain that balance in a manner that fully supports creative
activity of high-quality and high-investment works. An aggressive
weak rights position fails to do that.
Part I of this Article discusses the context of modern copyright
law and the conflict between the positions of rights enhancers and
Intellectual Property, in CoPY FIGHTS 17, 19 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews, eds., 2002)
(discussing the positions of various camps in the debate over intellectual property rights); Daniel
A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines: Intellectual Property and Free Speech in
the "Digital Millennium", 89 MINN. L. REV. 1318, 1347 (2005) ("[Elach side [in the copyright
debate] tries to convince the other that its position is obvious and natural, whereas the other
side's is radical and contrived."); Fred Koenigsberg, Humpty-Dumpty in Copyrightland, 51 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 677, 679 (2004) ('There is a battle raging between those who support
creativity - led by creative talents such as songwriters, composers, lyricists, authors, and the
business entities underwriting them, such as music publishers and motion picture companies -
and those who do not - such as those in the so- called Internet 'community' who claim
'information wants to be free."'); David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2004) ("[T]hose who debate copyright often seem to talk past each other."); Paul M.
Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and
Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2332 (2003) (describing the
anti-rights perspective as "IP Restrictors").
4. See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INT'L INTELL. PROP. ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN
THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2003--2007 REPORT (2009), available at www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPASiwek
Report2003-07.pdf.
5. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(explaining that the Copyright Act "involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors
and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand,
and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other
hand"). Compare Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway'" Authors,
Exploiters and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1468 (1995) ("[U]ser rights,
albeit important, should remain secondary. Without authors, there are no works to use."), with
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 325-27 (1970) (arguing that extending copyright
protection would be more harmful than beneficial).
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rights restrictors. Copyright law in the United States has been
associated with providing incentives to authors and artists to create
and distribute creative works. 6 The substantive content of copyright
law and the feasibility of its enforcement, however, also plays a role in
setting social norms about whether copying the work of another is
appropriate.7 A weak rights regime does not well serve this function
of copyright law, especially in a digital era where fast and perfect
copying is often possible-at least not if one believes that creative
authors or artists should have some control over copying and
distribution of their works.
Turning from the reinforcement of social norms to protect
intellectual property and focusing on economic incentives, the outcome
of the debate between stronger or weaker rights has different effects
on works whose costs and purposes of creation differ. Reduced rights
(weakened incentives) are conducive to supporting low (or no) cost
works that often borrow heavily from the works of others. Strong
rights (strengthened incentives) are conducive to works that require
teams of reporters or artists, significant investments in creating or
distributing the work, or a need (or desire) to commercially recoup the
investment of time or resources. In addition, in modern digital
contexts, the choice between a weak or a strong rights position online
affects a third group. Weak rights on the Internet shift value from
content creators to corporate aggregators or search engines. A need
exists for a balance in copyright law that provides sufficiently strong
protection and incentives for content providers.
The policy conflict between advocates of strong rights and
advocates of weak rights makes copyright an unstable, albeit
sometimes effective, means of protecting distributed informational
works. Part II discusses two other bodies of law to which information
providers have turned to enhance and control commercialization of
their works. Both of these have received, and should continue to
receive, support in courts and legislatures. First, there has been an
increase in the use of contractual arrangements at all levels of the
6. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (stating "[tihe economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors").
7. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMs (2000) (discussing the relationship
between law and social norms; see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997) (discussing the relationship between law and
social norms); Geoffrey Neri, Note, Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms? Unauthorized Music
Downloading and Unsettled Social Norms, 93 GEO. L.J. 733 (2005).
2011] 829
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distribution chain. 8  Contracts are particularly useful in
commercialization of digital content because contractual terms can
tailor rights to the marketplace in ways that copyright law cannot,
and can establish an alternative means of enforcement when copyright
protection is not available.9 Not surprisingly, many rights restrictors
argue that contracts should not be permitted to alter the weak-rights
balance they believe should apply under copyright law.10 Courts
properly reject this argument."
The second body of law comes from the anti-circumvention
rules of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that protect
against circumvention of "a technological measure that effectively
controls access" to a copyrighted work.' 2  These access control
provisions create a form of protection for copyrighted works that suits
the digital environment by focusing on control of access to a work as a
separate issue in addition to a right to control copying and
distribution. 13 Not surprisingly, rights restrictors have attacked these
provisions as placing inappropriate restrictions on so-called rights of
fair use and access to works placed in public distribution. 14
8. See generally Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of
Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335 (1996);
Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World
of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 129 (1997); Holly K. Towle, The Politics of
Licensing Law, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 161-68 (1999).
9. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1104-05, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010)
(enforcing use terms and finding that a transaction was not a first sale because of contract
terms); Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that fair use does
not preclude contrary contract terms); DaimlerChrysler Servs. N. Am., L.L.C. v. Summit Nat'l,
Inc., 144 Fed. App'x 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding § 117 rights irrelevant to a breach of
contract claim), claim dismissed, No. 02-71871, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32049 (E.D. Mich. May
22, 2006); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that copyright
does not preempt contract and enforcing contract despite lack of copyright claim).
10. See, e.g., David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 17, 23 (1999) ("This balance [of copyright law] is disrupted when state [contract]
law is permitted to enlarge the rights of copyright proprietors at the expense of copyright
users."); David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright Act
First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157 (1990).
11. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
13. See MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 942-58 (9th Cir.
2010) (applying the DMCA to access control measures in video-game software); see also
RAYMOND T. NIMMER & HOLLY K. TOWLE, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
1 1.03 (2003 ed. & Supp. 2011) (discussing, among other things, the emergence of various forms
of law relating to the control of access to intangible assets).
14. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202-04 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (reacting to these concerns and incorporating a restrictive and non-statutory
requirement into enforcement of a DMCA action).
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Given the rapid change of distribution systems and of
information products in our economy and the diversity of the copyright
industries, there is no single, silver bullet that will restore stability
and strength to content industries, and certainly no magic that will
fully restore older business models suited for a pre-digital era. But
content creators and providers need to work with re-examined and
adjusted business and legal models to maintain support for the types
of investment and systematic development that contributes to a flow
of high quality content. They also must work to establish and
maintain respect for informational property by a significant part of
society, along with a legal and enforcement structure that supports
this in a digital context. In this, it is essential that a strong rights
regime provide support for their efforts.
I. THE COPYRIGHT CONTEXT
This is an era in which many areas of law and of society are in
flux. Copyright law in this fluid context has been transformed from a
relatively narrow, backwater legal regime to a body of law that plays a
central role in our economy and our society. 15 As a consequence, the
context in which copyright policy is made and enforced is both complex
and economically significant.
A. Norms and Copyright Law
Copyright has several important functions associated with
supporting informational works. The most frequently discussed
involves establishing incentives for the creation and distribution of
works of authorship by establishing rights in the author or artist that
can be converted into economic or other benefits, or that at least can
provide support for investment or other commitment of resources.16
Before discussing the role of incentives, however, it is
important to understand a related function of copyright law. As with
many other bodies of law, one role of copyright law involves
reinforcing and shaping social norms or expectations, in this case with
reference to the handling (copying and distribution) of works involving
creative or other informational content.17 This may be the most
15. This expanded role tracks the increased economic importance of the copyright
industries themselves. See generally. SIWEK, supra note 4.
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17. From the perspective of law and economics scholarship, the role of social norms in
reference to law and social impact is most often seen as challenging or displacing the rational
actor, individual choice model that underlies some of the scholarship in that field. See generally
2011] 831
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important function of copyright from the standpoint of content
creators or providers today. How copyright law is formulated and
enforced helps shape the social context in which creative works are
made and distributed.
That social context is critically important to the creative
enterprise and to the copyright industries. A society in which a
substantial majority believe that there is no value in protecting or
respecting informational property rights will not support or sustain an
effective copyright law regime or, ultimately, effective copyright-based
industries.18 A society in which a substantial majority see no harm in
routinely copying and widely distributing the work of another rejects a
basic theme of copyright law and a basic pillar of copyright.
Copyright and its enforcement, along with enforcement of
related laws, have a role in shaping societal perceptions. The impact
can be substantial and sudden. Consider the related area of data
protection privacy law, which provides rights for an individual to
protect and control uses of personal, non-sensitive data held by a third
party who obtained it properly.19 As recently as 1995, the widespread
view in the United States was that the person in possession of such
information could do with it what she chose, absent confidentiality
restrictions, highly sensitive information, or illegal conduct.20 Then,
fueled in part by policies developed in Europe,21 a sea change in law
NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-
MODERNISM AND BEYOND 171-76 (2d ed. 2006); POSNER, supra note 7. It is clear that there is an
interaction between social norms or expectations and legal norms or rules. The role of norm-
setting in reference to copyright issues has been less well-explored than has the idea that rules
generally rejected by society will become unenforceable. Cf McAdams, supra note 7; Neri, supra
note 7.
18. See WLLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS xxiv (2009) ("Laws
should be fair, fit for their purpose, and accountable to the reality of the world we live in. We do
not respect, and will not follow, laws that conflict with the realities of our lives, nor should we.");
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: The
Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783, 804 (2005) ("To the extent that
citizens reject rules that target people unfairly, they may similarly reject the legal system that
promulgates and enforces such rules. In these circumstances, enforcing rules that do not embody
a shared community norm may actually undermine the formation of a norm against the
forbidden conduct.").
19. See generally RAYMOND T. NIMMER & HOLLY K. TOWLE, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS T1 12:04-12:08 (2003 ed. & Supp. 2011).
20. See Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 306 F.3d 806, 812-18 (9th
Cir. 2002); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1355-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (finding no
privacy breach for distribution of purchasing patterns of credit card customers); State v.
Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 752, 761 (Mo. 1997) (finding that defendant relinquished any expectation
of privacy in photographs by giving them to the developer).
21. See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31-39 (EC). See generally Joel Reidenberg,
[Vol. 13:4:825832
CONTENT PROTECTION IN DIGITAL CONTEXT
occurred. Legislation, regulations, and litigation in state and federal
venues focused on new rights of the data-subject to control use of the
data in the hands of the third party, even if the data was not of a
highly sensitive character or traditionally confidential. 22 Today it is
common to hear that "privacy" in this sense is severely "threatened"
by the Internet and digital systems; many would now argue that
"privacy" is a value whose "preservation" should be fought for, even
though data privacy did not in fact exist as a widely protected value
two decades ago. 2 3 The changes in law, coupled with other factors,
contributed to a rapid change in social perceptions of data privacy on
the part of a significant portion of our society. 24
Law matters in shaping societal expectations and norms. A
bounded interaction exists between laws and social norms, with each
influencing the other. 25 Law in a democratic society cannot reverse
course and suddenly, fundamentally alter widespread and firmly held
social norms.26 But the direction in which law points can have a
significant impact, especially when social norms are as unsettled as
they are today.
With respect to copyright law and the content industries,
sustaining norms that support strong rights is the point on which a
weak rights approach may have its greatest adverse impact. In a
world in which copying and redistribution is easy and many people
seem to regard unauthorized copying as socially acceptable, what
image of social acceptability should law support? At the extreme weak
Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497,
500 (1995) (discussing data protection law and the European Union's Directive).
22. See NIMMER & TOWLE, supra note 13 11 2.12, 2.16; 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER,
INFORMATION LAW §§ 8:1-8:96 (2006 ed. & Supp. 2010).
23. See sources cited supra note 20.
24. Whether or not the new laws can be effectively enforced remains to be seen. Indeed,
given the burgeoning success of so-called social media, there clearly exists a segment of society
that does not regard many personal facts as private and discloses them on the Internet, and it
remains easy to discover large amounts of information about individuals on the Internet despite
the sudden spike in legislative and regulatory attention to protecting data privacy. Perhaps
David Brin was right when he said in 1996: "Privacy is history, get over it." Sheldon Teitelbaum,
Privacy is History-Get Over It, WIRED, Feb. 1996, http://www.wired.com/wiredlarchive/4.02/brin.
html.
25. See McAdams, supra note 7, at 339-42; Neri, supra note 7, at 746 ("Of course, the
distinction between 'law' and 'social norms' is somewhat artificial in that the two are interrelated
and in constant interaction--the law shapes social norms and is simultaneously shaped by
them.").
26. See Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public
Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account when Formulating
Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 716 (2000) ("Even if murder were suddenly made
legal, most people would not commit murders because murdering someone would still be
contrary to their own sense of what is right and wrong.").
2011] 833
VANDERBILT J OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
rights position, the answer is that law should support the view that in
general what can be copied should be copied. One of the most
discussed corporate copyright programs of the last decade illustrates
this. It involved a multi-billion dollar corporation (Google) asserting
that it had the right to make digital copies of all books in print
without the prior approval of the copyright owners.27 Google took the
position that its copying was fair use and, in any event, that copyright
owners were not harmed because, if they objected, Google would not
copy their works. 28 The Google Book Project led to litigation and a
proposed settlement on a class-action basis.29
Putting aside the merits of that project or the proposed
settlement, the Google Book Project epitomizes the weak rights
perspective and communicates a powerful social message: Holding a
copyright merely gives one a right to object, not a presumptive right to
control use of a creative work. If accepted in law or in practice, the
project's approach would tend to validate a culture of copying, rather
than a culture of presumptive respect for the property rights of others.
A similar observation could be made for those who would validate in
copyright law widespread copying over P2P or similar systems. The
message pulls social expectations and norms in the wrong direction.
Law should support a culture of presumptive respect for
content creators' property. This does not mean that no unauthorized
copying will occur or even that this should be viewed as a realistic
goal. Thus, the fact that today many college students and others
frequently copy digital works without authority to do so says little
about the direction in which law should attempt to shape social
expectations. The idea that perfect enforcement of any law can be
achieved is a myth, whose pursuit only harms the debate about what
an appropriate normative structure should be for the digital age.
While many people make unauthorized copies of digital works, many
others do not. Law should reinforce and spread the attitude and
perspective of this latter group.
Support for strong copyright protection also does not mean that
no other interests should be recognized. Copyright law has always
entailed a balancing between author's rights and reserving some uses
and some content for use by others,30 but we need to understand
27. See Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyber Space,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1308 (2010).
28. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 6.03 (5th ed. 2010).
29. Id.
30. See id.; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (explaining that the Copyright Act "involves a difficult balance between the interests of
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one
[Vol. 13:4:825834
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clearly what we are balancing and where the balance is being made.
Copyright law exempts ideas and facts from protection, preserving
them for use by subsequent authors. 31 It also recognizes a privilege of
fair use 32 and a narrow first-sale exemption.33  But the balance
established by these and other exemptions in copyright law implies
only a limited borrowing, and it often involves using the borrowed
material to build new works or for purely personal non-commercial
use.34 As Professor Ginsburg has reminded us: "[U]ser rights, albeit
important, should remain secondary. Without authors, there are no
works to use."3 5
A line drawn in this way is far different from one drawn with
expansive rights or privileges reserved for secondary parties and only
narrow rights for original creators of works. It is far different, for
example, from arguing that the purchaser of a CD has a right to copy
songs from it and distribute copies to many of her friends and
acquaintances or that the friends have a right to download copies from
a peer-to-peer (P2P) system created and operated without the consent
of the copyright owners.36 A user may have a right to use small
portions of a prior work along with his own expression to create a new
work, but that is different from saying that he engages in fair use by
making unauthorized copies of the entire prior work and using it for a
purpose different from that intended by the copyright owner when he
originally distributed it.37
One author comments:
hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on
the other hand"); Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 1468 ("[U]ser rights, albeit important, should
remain secondary. Without authors, there are no works to use.").
31. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
32. Id. § 107.
33. Id. § 109.
34. In some cases, the limited, narrow nature of the original work makes it inseparable
from the idea it states or the facts it reports, and comprehensive copying is permitted, but this is
the infrequent exception to the broader meaning of the rule that one can copy ideas and facts
from a prior work. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 3:4. Compare Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991) (determining that alphabetical telephone directory is
unprotected by copyright), with Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding
that a table of selected variables predicting baseball pitchers' performance constituted protected
expression).
35. Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 1468.
36. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889-91 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that
downloading music files to review their content for possible future purchase was not fair use).
37. But the latter argument has been made and won in some cases. See Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that use of thumbnail image in
commercial search engine was transformative and, thus, fair use); A.V. v. iParadigms, L.L.C.,
544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 484 (E.D. Va. 2008) (concluding that unauthorized use of manuscript in
search system was fair use).
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Even if traditional copyright doctrines may not apply comfortably in cyberspace, we
could work to install their functional equivalents. The challenge though remains the
same: how to enhance public welfare with some balance between the interests of
copyright owners and those of users. Striking this balance has never been easy from a
theoretical or political standpoint. But the struggle to do so must continue because its
goal is a social imperative and worth the fight.
3 8
When balances are to be drawn, they should generally favor the
author of the original work except as to limited copying for truly
personal use, or copying of small parts of the original, or as to the
ideas or facts expressed in the original, none of which threatens
commercial incentives or social perspectives about the value of
protecting copyright interests.
B. Balances Shape the Direction of Creative Expression
In the United States, copyright law is generally associated with
a purpose of establishing incentives for the creation and distribution
of expressive works of authorship. 39 The incentives flow from the
author's ability to control for personal benefit various uses of the
work. The author potentially obtains a personal gain, but more
importantly, society as a whole benefits from an increased output of
creative work. This general statement, however, masks important
differences in how and why various types of works are created and,
thus, how copyright-based incentives affect creative work effort. There
is a vivid difference in the potential impact of copyright incentives
between information content generated without editing or expectation
of profit by individuals (e.g. home videos), on the one hand, and
informational content created, generated or distributed at substantial
cost and with at least the hope of economic gain, on the other (e.g.,
investigative news reports). Some works are expensive to make and
some are not. Cost and investment correlate frequently, although not
always, to relative quality. The motion picture Avatar may not be
perfect entertainment, but the character and quality of that product
differs starkly from the video placed on YouTube by Joe Smith who
filmed himself eating pizza while watching Avatar on a flat screen
television.40 One does not have to denigrate Joe's work to recognize
38. LEAFFER, supra note 28, at 30 (footnotes omitted); see also Douglas G. Baird,
Changing Technology and Unchanging Doctrine: Sony Corporation v. Universal Studios, Inc.,
1984 SUP. CT. REV. 237, 238, 249-50 (describing the effect of time lag in litigation in context of
rapidly changing technology).
39. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
40. Although one of the themes of the weak rights side of the copyright debate involves
a strong attraction for user-generated, low-cost content enabled by digital and Internet
technology, even a leading advocate of the weak rights position acknowledges that much of such
content has very low quality. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX 92 (2008) ("There's no comparing ten
[Vol. 13:4:825836
2011] CONTENT PROTECTION IN DIGITAL CONTEXT 837
that society is the net loser if this type of content becomes the sole
type of entertainment content available.
Not surprisingly, advocates of weak rights and broad public
domain positions emphasize the value of low or no-cost content. For
example, Professor Litman, one of the most articulate advocates of
this position, once commented:
The most powerful engine driving this information space turns out not to be money-at
least if we're focusing on generating and disseminating the content rather than
constructing the hardware that it moves through. What seems to be driving the
explosive growth in this information space is that people like to look things up, and they
want to share. This information economy is largely a gift economy. The overwhelming
majority of the information I'm talking about is initially posted by volunteers. Many of
them are amateurs, motivated by enthusiasm for their topics, a desire to pass
interesting stuff on, and, perhaps, an interest in attention and the benefits it may bring.
When one is a volunteer, the time and effort one is willing to put into contributing to the
information space can seem limitless. Volunteers move on, of course: they get bored, or
broke, or caught up in other things, but there seems to be an inexhaustible supply of
new volunteers to take their places, and, luckily, the new volunteers are able to build on
earlier volunteers' foundations. I potentially know all of the information the other
participants know. Their knowledge can be my knowledge with a few clicks of a mouse.
In return, I make my knowledge available to anyone who happens by. Each of us can
draw on the information stores of the others.
4 1
The Internet in general and various social networking sites
have led to an explosion of user-generated content (UGC). 42  This is
truly an important social development. Some UGC has fine creative
value, but much does not. Some is entirely the "creative" work of the
user who generates it, but much involves cutting or pasting
substantial portions of the work of others and posting it on an
Internet.4 3  Indeed, YouTube, one of the currently most popular
Internet sites, contains widespread infringing posts. 44
The vast difference between low-cost UGC with often high
levels of copying, on the one hand, and high-cost works with high
originality, on the other, underscores the policy choice underlying
copyright law and content protection today. When we talk about a
balance between rights given to original creators and privileges given
minutes produced by J. J. Abrams and ten minutes from any of the stuff that passes for video
production on YouTube. . . . The vast majority of remix, like the vast majority of home movies, or
consumer photographs, or singing in the shower, or blogs, is just crap. Most of these products are
silly or derivative, a waste of even the creator's time, let alone the consumer's.").
41. Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 8-9
(2004).
42. See generally Id.; Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/issues/ip-and-free-speech/fair-use-principles-
usergen (last visited Apr. 8, 2011).
43. See Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., supra, note 42.
44. See Viacom Int'l, Inc., v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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to those who would use portions (or the entirety) of their works, we are
in part at least discussing a policy choice about what type of creative
works our intellectual property structure supports. Maintaining a
supply of creative works like Avatar requires strong economic
incentives and support to recover the substantial investment
involved.45 If we were to view the difference between these two types
of content as residing on a continuum, the problems of economic
sustainability fall closer to the Avatar side, while much of the
information on Internet social network systems lies closer to the Joe
Smith video. This point would be even clearer if the content Joe
Smith "created" consisted merely of a digital copy of Avatar and his
creative input involved finding and posting a copy.
A risk exists that as economic incentives weaken, the high-cost
and high-investment products will be less frequently produced. For
example, newspapers will strip their staff size and rely on lower cost,
less experienced reporters; many newspapers will go out of business.
This is already happening around the country.46 Blogs increasingly
provide news and other information and play a valuable social role,
but they are unlikely to replace or replicate the investigative and
other journalism that requires support of local and national
newspapers. 47 We face a risk that the miraculous communications
systems created by digital technology will communicate increasingly
low grade information. 48
Our society needs a framework in which low-cost, true UGC (as
compared to copies of another's work who does not want the copies
made) and higher-cost, creative works co-exist, and the incentive
structure needed support the higher-cost works is maintained. There
is no social value in allowing an end user to post an unauthorized,
verbatim copy of a song for widespread copying by others. 49 There
45. See Avatar (2009 film), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avatar_(2009-
film)#cite ref-vanityfair 18-0 (last visited May 10, 2011) (Avatar had an original budget of $237
million, with estimated actual costs of between $280 million and $310 million, plus $150 million
in promotion).
46. See Lauren M. Gregory, Note, Hot Off the Presses: How Traditional Newspaper
Journalism Can Help Reinvent the "Hot News" Misappropriate Torts in the Internet Age, 13
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 577 (2011).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., LEAFFER, supra note 28, at 28 ("Some assert ... we need a copyright
paradigm for the protection of informational products to meet the digital challenge. Without the
ability to exclude others in the networked environment, information providers will have little
incentive to disseminate works that take a heavy investment in time and effort. The fear is that
we may be left with these wonderful digital copying and transmission technologies with less and
less worth copying.").
49. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889-91 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that
downloading music files to review their content for possible future purchase was not fair use);
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may be value, however, for an end user who takes small portions of
five works and mashes them together into an entirely new work of her
own. The law needs to make the distinction.
C. The Conflict over Copyright
As described earlier, there are diametric views about the
proper scope and balance of copyright rights and user privileges in the
digital economy.5 0 Rights restrictors believe, in general, that strong
intellectual property rights stifle subsequent creative work and
disrupt or preclude the creation of efficient, relatively low (or no) cost
secondary markets for digital information.51 Strong rights, according
to this view, diminish the ability of subsequent parties to use part or
all of the original work in their own, or to use (e.g., copy or distribute)
the entire work for purposes different than the original, intended work
or simply to share the work with others.52 Rights restrictors thus
push to truncate rights and expand privileges or defenses so as to
enable subsequent parties to use (e.g., copy or distribute) portions or
all of an original work in ways over which the copyright owner will not
have control and from which no income will be derived. 53
The restrictive argument is not that no intellectual property
rights should exist, but that the rights should provide only the
minimum necessary protection. Rights restrictors ultimately argue
United States v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Limited copying may be permissible
for certain noncommercial, educational purposes, taking into account the nature of the
copyrighted work and market considerations. These factors, however, weigh against application
of the fair use doctrine to cases involving Internet piracy. PWA allowed members to obtain
unlawful, digital duplicates of thousands of commercially available software programs.. . . It is
preposterous to think that Internet piracy is authorized by virtue of the fair use doctrine.").
50. See 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ch.1 (4th ed., 2009 &
Supp. 2010). See generally ADRIAN JONES, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM
GUTENBERG TO GATES (2009).
51. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 40; Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm,
Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969 (2007); Julie Cohen, Copyright as Post-
Industrial Property, 2011 WISC. L. REV (forthcoming 2011), available at http://www.
law.georgetown.edu/faculty/jec/documents/postindustrialeconomy.pdf; Jessica Litman, Lawful
Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within
the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Malla Pollack, A Listeners'Free Speech, A
Reader's Copyright, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1457 (2007); Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and
Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 326 (2003).
52. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 51 (contending that personal use is diminishing).
53. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 33 (2003); Litman, supra note 51; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J.
965, 997-98 (1990). Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)
(establishing concept of transformative use as fair use).
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that, when in doubt, courts and legislators should err on the side of
reducing rights, rather than expanding them. 54 An important policy
goal from this perspective is to protect a broad public domain of
information assets from which authors, artists, and the general public
can draw for their own purposes.55 Those who accept this perspective
argue that the information should be both free and freely available.56
But of course, copyright law has always created a public domain in the
sense of some content to which property rights do not attach, such as
ideas, facts, and processes, and some works that are out of their
copyright term.5 7 But access to such material might not be cost-free-
for example, finding and acquiring access to an out-of-print British
novel from 1850 may be very expensive indeed although it is public
domain material.
One author captures part of the fear of the rights restrictors
that the new technologies and new means of creating and
communicating information will exacerbate what they see as a
problem of too much control by rights owners:
The emergent business model for the distribution of copyrighted works in the network
environment seems to challenge the survival of an "informational commons." The day
may soon be upon us when copyrighted works reside primarily in electronic
networks . . .. The trend is that readers, listeners, and viewers of copyrighted works are
having less and less unencumbered lawful personal use of books, films, or music in a
technological and legal environment in which uses are easier to trace, and charge
for.... In short, technology may make it possible for information proprietors to treat
every use as a new instance of "access." The fear is that such proprietors could
maximize profits while continuing to withhold their works from general scrutiny,
including fair use.5 8
This quotation accurately captures the range of emotional, sometimes
conflicting concerns from this perspective that emerge as a result of
new technologies. The transformation to digital and online
distribution of information materials does shift attention toward
controlling access to a work in law and in fact as a means of
commercializing it, but this response to a changed technological
environment to preserve profits and economic incentives does not
necessarily threaten core values in an information society. 59
While the quotation refers to unencumbered "personal use,"
suggesting use by an individual for personal or family purposes, the
54. See DeLong, supra note 3, at 17, 19.
55. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 53; Boyle, supra note 53.
56. Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996,
http://www.wired.com/wiredlarchive/4.01/white.paper.html.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); see also Boyle, supra note 53.
58. LEAFFER, supra note 28, at 29-30.
59. See NIMMER & TOWLE, supra note 13, at ch. 2.
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rights-restrictive perspective goes far beyond that. Rights restrictors
often argue that commercial uses should be allowed-that verbatim
copying for commercial use is a "fair use" if the copyright owner has
not yet entered the same market, 60 that first sale doctrine permits
commercial resale of copies even if the reseller is a licensee under a
license that precludes resale,61 and that a commercial website is not
liable for contributing to infringement even though it knows that
infringing copies are ubiquitous on its site. 62 One author suggests
that a leading organization that supports the restrictive view
apparently believes that when copyright law is in actual or perceived
conflict with any other social interest, the other interest should
prevail.63
The nexus between the rights-restrictive approach and support
for low-cost, user-generated-content can be seen in various contexts.
One example is a report on user-generated content by the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) and others:
Online video hosting services like YouTube are ushering in a new era of free expression
online. By providing a home for "user-generated content" (UGC) on the Internet, these
services enable creators to reach a global audience without having to depend on
traditional intermediaries like television networks and movie studios. The result has
been an explosion of creativity by ordinary people, who have enthusiastically embraced
the opportunities created by these new technologies to express themselves in a
remarkable variety of ways. The life blood of much of this new creativity is fair use, the
copyright doctrine that permits unauthorized uses of copyrighted material for
transformative purposes.
6 4
EFF itself acknowledges the obvious-that much of the "new
creativity" enabled by new technology involves copying others' work,
protected only, if at all, by the doctrine of fair use.65 The claim that
fair use applies must be understood as advocacy-stating the rights
restrictive view that fair use should apply, rather than stating any
settled legal point. The applicability of the doctrine varies. Joe Smith
might very well be engaged in fair use if the background of his pizza-
eating video posted online consists of small snippets of Avatar, but if
his video involves a digital copy of the movie with a small insert of him
eating pizza in one corner of the screen, the video is not fair use.
60. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that use of thumbnail image in commercial search engine was transformative and, thus,
fair use).
61. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1104-05, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
This argument was accepted by the trial court, but rejected by the Ninth Circuit. Id.
62. Viacom Int'l, Inc., v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(holding that YouTube qualified for safe harbor protection under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)).
63. See DeLong, supra note 3, at 18-20.
64. Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, supra note 42.
65. Id.
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Importantly, EFF is a major rights-restrictive organization, and
routinely appears in court, taking positions adverse to copyright
owners.66
Rights enhancers, on the other hand, focus on preserving
strong support and incentives for creative work;67 this approach is
conducive to supporting work associated with the higher-cost end of
the continuum discussed earlier. This approach is premised on the
belief that strong intellectual property rights are essential to
preserving the innovation that has led to the modern explosion in
information assets and their widespread distribution. 68  Strong
protection of intellectual property is important, especially with respect
to the many contexts in which substantial time, cost, and effort are
involved in creating a work or collecting, organizing, or promoting
information. Modern technology, while offering new opportunities for
creating and distributing information, also threatens the practical
ability to enforce rights, thus weakening incentives established under
copyright law.6 9
The argument ultimately is that this effect should be offset by
strengthened, tailored rights, or at least by the enforcement of
existing rights in digital contexts.70 The argument is not that there
should be no exemptions or defenses to assertion of rights, but that
the balance should be drawn in a manner favorable to maintaining
robust incentives for creative work, even if that narrows room for
secondary uses or requires new protections in the digital world:
In particular, corporate providers of copyrighted content . .. [view] the network
environment [as] a place of great opportunity and tremendous risk... . [As to the risk,]
they perceive the Internet as a present danger to their valuable intangible assets. Their
66. For a summary of the organizations activities, see ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
www.eff.org (last visited May 11, 2011).
67. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 22-28 (Stanford Univ. Press rev. ed.
2003) (1994); HELPRIN, supra note 3; Tom W. Bell, Authors' Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory
Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 237 (2003); DeLong, supra note 3,
at 31-33 (arguing that innovation will spread more rapidly if creators have incentives to find
new uses for their creations and to open new markets for them); Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 1468
("[U]ser rights, albeit important, should remain secondary. Without authors, there are no works
to use."); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 259
(describing incentives for would-be authors to create informational works in cyberspace);
Koenigsberg, supra note 3, at 679.
68. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 50, at ch.1.
69. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir. 2001); see also
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No.
105-17.
70. Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 1468 ("[U]ser rights, albeit important, should remain
secondary. Without authors, there are no works to use."); see Hardy, supra note 67, at 259.
[Vol. 13:4:825842
2011] CONTENT PROTECTION IN DIGITAL CONTEXT 843
aim, then, is to make the network environment "safe" for digital commerce in
information and entertainment products.7 1
When the conflict between restrictors and enhancers first emerged in
the digital context, some characterized the pro-rights side as occupied
by large corporations that control the production of content, while the
restrictors were comprised of individuals and their public spirited
activists. 72 That was probably never true. 73 But to the extent it was
true, the characterizations resulted from the fact that a weakening of
the incentive structure strikes hardest against the higher-cost creative
work projects, while it frees up individuals from paying for use of the
work of others.
That caricature of the dispute-as being between big (pro-
rights) and small (anti-rights) players-is certainly not true today. As
described below, in modern digital systems, the weak rights position
yields a value shift from creators of content and their distributors to
online facilitators (aggregators and search engines) without
compensation to the creators. 74 Massively wealthy search engine
companies are among the strongest supporters of a rights-restrictive
position, at least as to others' content and trademarks.75 Also, large
companies in the copyright industries are both users of others' work
and creators and distributors of their own works, resulting in a
sometimes schizophrenic corporate approach to the issues.76 The best
characterization is that both sides are populated by large and small
71. LEAFFER, supra note 28, at 28.
72. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 2; Farber, supra note 3, at 1332.
73. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 3, at 1360 n.64 ("This vision of the 'little guy' versus the
corporations is clearly an oversimplification. Important corporate interests can be found on both
sides of the debate, with the digital technology industry often aligned against content providers."
(quoting Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 533 (1999))).
74. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146,1168 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that use of a thumbnail image in a commercial search engine was transformative and,
thus, fair use; a search engine provider could make commercial use of the images without a
license or any payment to content creator). This same result can spill over to other laws. See, e.g.,
Scranton Times, L.P. v. Wilkes-Barre Publ'g Co., No. 3:08-cv-2135, 2009 WL 3100963, at *5-6
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2009) (dismissing misappropriation claim against company that copied online
obituaries from news site was preempted by copyright act; obituaries were, apparently, not
copyrightable by the news site).
75. See generally Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1172 ; Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc.,
456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 401 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[I]n the absence of allegations that defendant placed
plaintiffs trademark on any goods, displays, containers, or advertisements, or used plaintiffs
trademark in any way that indicates source or origin, plaintiff can prove no facts in support of its
claim which would demonstrate trademark use."); Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F.
Supp. 2d 700, 704-06 (E.D. Va. 2004) (finding sufficient facts alleged to find use in commerce);
Samuelson, supra note 27.
76. See Holly K. Towle, The Politics of Licensing Law, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 161-68
(1999).
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corporations, foundations, lawyers, academics, and individuals, all of
whom have various levels of political, economic and personal stakes in
the outcome of the debate.
As to copyright law, rights enhancers argue that doctrines of
fair use and the non-protection of the ideas in a work are important,
but should be cabined to their original purpose, which is to permit use
of limited portions of a published work for productive purposes or
truly personal, non-commercial use with no substantial adverse
impact on the market for the work.77 Under this view, it is not fair use
to take a copy of a work verbatim and copy it for unauthorized
commercial purposes78 or to post it on the Internet or load it into a
computer with peer-to-peer software in the system to be copied by
others for their own use.7 9 While copyright first-sale doctrine gives
the owner of a copy certain privileges with respect to it, ownership
depends on how the copyright owner chooses to distribute the copy;
distribution pursuant to a restrictive license does not transfer
ownership.80
The strong rights approach is far superior to the weak rights
approach in terms of incentivizing or otherwise supporting the
creation of new works where commitments of substantial resources or
investments are required. The weak rights approach ultimately seeks
to shift the emphasis of copyright toward enabling secondary uses
(including verbatim copying) and low (or no) cost works where
compensation to, or investment by, the author are far less important.
In a digital world, granting broad and unlimited rights to end users to
make and distribute verbatim copies undermines core support for
expensive work efforts in return for supporting conduct of often
questionable value.81
77. Compare Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984)
(holding that copying of broadcast television programs for purposes of later home viewing was
fair use), with A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that acts of individuals uploading and downloading music to central site were commercial uses
and not fair use; users downloading obtain some or free that was otherwise only available at a
cost).
78. But see Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1172 (noting fair use where copy used for
purpose different from the copyright owner's original purpose).
79. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
downloading music files to review their content for possible future purchase was not fair use).
80. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107-09 (9th Cir. 2010); DSC
Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
81. But see LESSIG, supra note 40, at 92 (2008) (arguing that a hybrid or mixed system
of free information and commerce can evolve, although acknowledging that much user-generated
content has little value). The argument, however, is less than persuasive when matched against
the cost of high investment content creation, such as in motion pictures.
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The strong rights view also supports the use of alternative
legal regimes such as contract, access controls, and civil actions under
computer crime laws to establish control of access to informational
works as an alternative to controlling copying in a digital world where
copying is perfect, potentially instantaneous, widespread, and difficult
to prevent.82  As discussed below, using other law to augment
copyright in the digital environment is troubling to the rights-
restrictive viewpoint, especially insofar as it threatens fair use and
first-sale privileges.83
The weak rights position is sometimes incorrectly connected to
what one author describes as the "hive" development of works, 84 the
creation of works by contributions from a broad community, such as in
the various "Wiki" works online. The two phenomena do in fact flow
from a similar ideology that values breadth of participation and
freedom of use over central or proprietary control or development.
Wiki projects, however, do not depend on weak intellectual property
rights. The various contributors consent to their contributions' use
and modification by others. 85 Strong rights coupled with consent
(licenses) to particular uses are fully consistent with a theory of strong
rights.
Indeed, one of the most discussed community or hive
development environments-the free software community-relies on
strong copyright rights to enforce the licenses at the core of their
communities.86  In fact some participants in the free software
community claim that their licenses are not contracts at all, indicating
that the community's legal right to enforce restrictions on transferees
82. See MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937-42 (9th Cir.
2010) (recognizing that 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) enacted federal judgment that digital environment
merited the creation of a right to enforce control of access to a copyrighted work); see also
Raymond T. Nimmer, First Amendment Speech and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A
Proper Marriage, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
ANALYSES, (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen, eds., 2005). But cf. Timothy B. Lee,
Circumventing Competition: The Perverse Consequences of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
POL'Y ANALYSIS, no. 564, Mar. 21, 2006, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa564.pdf.
83. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 10; Samuelson, supra note 56. But cf. Towle, supra note
76.
84. JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET 48-50 (2010).
85. See, e.g., Terms of Use, WIKIMEDIA FOUND., http://wikimediafoundation.org/
wikilTerms-ofUse (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
86. See NIMMER, supra note 50, § 10:19; David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-
Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241; Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-
Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563.
2011] 845
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
to maintain the "free" nature of the software depends entirely on
copyright.87
D. Content Facilitators or Content Creators
There is another interest group that has a stake in the rights-
restrictor versus rights-enhancer debate. The rights restrictor view of
copyright as applied online shifts value away from content creators
and towards content facilitators-aggregators, search engine
providers, and providers of technology that facilitates copying or
distribution of digital works.
The issue here is not whether these important participants in
the digital network world deserve support. Rather, the important
question is to what extent commercial content providers should share
in the value, or have some control over use of their works, in these
digital systems. The answer, in part, is that online, to the extent that
assertion of rights against content facilitators is cut off, content
creators lose a potentially important revenue stream, ceding it to
technology operators.88  The argument is not that the content
providers should control all revenues from these secondary uses, but
that based on their property rights they should participate in some of
the revenue and control.
In the digital era, the tension between technology providers
and content owners first surfaced in litigation involving so-called peer-
to-peer (P2P) systems. The earliest cases were relatively easy to
decide because they involved centralized systems facilitating massive
amounts of unauthorized exchange of files. The appellate courts
routinely held that operators of these systems were either direct or
contributory infringers. 89 The users of the systems who copied or
distributed works were also infringers.90
87. See Eben Moglen, Free Software Matters: Enforcing the GPL, I, LINUX USER &
DEVELOPER, Aug. 12, 2001, available at http://moglen.1aw.columbia.edu/publications/lu-12.pdf;
Pamela Jones, The GPL is a License, Not a Contract, LWN.NET (Dec. 3, 2003),
http://lwn.net/Articles/61292.
88. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a search engine provider could make commercial use of thumbnail images without
a license or any payment to content creator).
89. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003), (holding the
peer-to-peer system provider liable for indirect infringement; users were direct infringers); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001).
90. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
downloading music files infringed and was not fair use); A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1029
(finding that downloading was commercial use, not fair use).
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A more difficult case arose in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,91
which involved a decentralized software system that enabled users to
make available and "share" (e.g., copy) content files residing on
various users' computers. 92  Grokster defended against the
contributory infringement claim arguing that it could not be held
liable for infringing uses of a product that it distributed to third
parties where there were substantial non-infringing uses of the
product.93 For example, the seller of a copying machine which can be
used to infringe but also can be used for non-infringing purposes
cannot be held liable for a particular buyer's wrongful conduct.94 That
doctrine was established in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.,95 which held that makers of video recording machines
could not be held liable for the infringing uses of the machines they
sold because the machines had substantial non-infringing uses (i.e.,
the personal fair use in private households to copy broadcast program
in order to shift the time when the person could watch them). The
Supreme Court in Grokster confirmed that Sony set out a balance
between allowing technology to advance without legal constraints
grounded in copyright law, on the one side, and protecting
informational content rights on the other. Grokster was not protected,
however, because it actively induced use of its system to infringe
copyrights. 96 As to the balance, the Court commented:
The tension between the two values is the subject of this case, with its claim that digital
distribution of copyrighted material threatens copyright holders as never before,
because every copy is identical to the original, copying is easy, and many people
(especially the young) use file-sharing software to download copyrighted works....
[The] indications are that the ease of copying songs or movies using software like
Grokster's and Napster's is fostering disdain for copyright protection. As the case has
been presented to us, these fears are said to be offset by the different concern that
91. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-23 (2005).
92. Id. at 922.
93. Id. at 933.
94. Id. at 934.
95. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984).
96. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37 ("[Tjhe inducement rule . . . is a sensible one for
copyright. We adopt it here, holding that one who distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. We
are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on regular commerce or discouraging
the development of technologies with lawful and unlawful potential. Accordingly, just as [in]
Sony ... mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough
here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution,
such as offering customers technical support or product updates, support liability in themselves.
The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct,
and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a
lawful promise.").
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imposing liability, not only on infringers but on distributors of software based on its
potential for unlawful use, could limit further development of beneficial technologies.
9 7
Thus, the perceived conflict is between protection of the
property rights and protection of the interest in emerging
technologies. But not all technologies are "beneficial," and not all
effects of even beneficial technologies are socially desirable when
counterbalanced by the negative impact they may have on the rights
of other parties, including copyright owners. More pertinently, the
conflict between technology and property is not an all-or-nothing
proposition. If the economics are such that a technological advance
meets a market demand, it is likely to be deployed. The property-
rights question deals with issues of participation: To what extent do
content-rights owners participate in business models that exploit their
content?98 Most often, for the technology provider, the question
becomes one of cost: To what extent does protection of, or deference to,
the property rights of the copyright owner impose a cost on the
distribution of the technology?
This issue is heightened in the Internet, where courts often get
the result wrong. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 v.
Amazon.com dealt with an online search engine that copied images
from other websites and reduced them to thumbnail images which
were then used commercially on a visual search engine. 99 All of this
occurred without the permission of the copyright owners or any
payment to them for use of their intellectual property. 00 Although the
court acknowledged that these facts presented a prima facie case of
direct infringement, it held that this verbatim copying was a protected
fair use:
Just as a "parody has an obvious claim to transformative value" because "it can provide
social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new
one," a search engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original work into a
new work, namely, an electronic reference tool. Indeed, a search engine may be more
transformative than a parody because a search engine provides an entirely new use for
the original work . .101
The court, however, misapplied the concept of "transformative use" set
out by the Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose.102 The Supreme Court there
97. Id. at 928-29 (citations omitted).
98. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001) (discussing the extent to
which authors would participate in decisions to computerize their contributions to collective
works, or whether this was entirely under the control of the publisher).
99. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1165 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
102. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 ("The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in
Justice Story's words, whether the new work merely 'supersedes the objects' of the original
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dealt with the use of part of a work to create an entirely different
work-a parody.103 In Perfect 10, in contrast, the defendant made a
complete copy of the work, albeit in altered form, and merely used it
for a purpose different from that originally intended by the copyright
owner. The different purpose, however, did not transform the work.
But it did preempt a market for the work that the rights owner might
have decided to enter through licensing.
More generally, the issue should not have been whether search
engines provide a social benefit.104 They clearly do. The issue should
have been whether copyright owners should be forced to contribute
their works to the search engine for free. This issue was one of
allocating value between the copyright owner and the search engine
aggregators. Certainly, the search engine would incur costs if
required to obtain licenses for the use of images, but absolving it from
those costs simply involves taking value from the copyright owner.
The Ninth Circuit stretched copyright law in a manner that shifts
value to the aggregator (search engine) and away from the content
creator.
Additionally, Perfect 10 presented the question of whether the
search engine could be indirectly liable for the infringing content on
some of the sites to which it linked.105 Indirect liability occurs where a
person (1) substantially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another, (2) induces the infringing conduct, or (3) is vicariously liable
for the infringement. 10 6 The court also protected the search engine on
the indirect infringement issue, holding that "a computer system
operator can be held contributorily liable [only] if it 'has actual
knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its
system,' and can 'take simple measures to prevent further damage' to
copyrighted works, yet continues to provide access to infringing
works."107 Requiring actual knowledge of specific infringements in an
online system places virtually the entire burden of enforcement on the
rights owner. This is consistent with a narrow view of copyright
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering
the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what
extent the new work is 'transformative."' (internal citations omitted)).
103. Id. at 572.
104. This same concept was recognized, but not resolved, in MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 92-30, (2005).
105. Id. at 1157.
106. See id. at 929-31; In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 656 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding peer-to-peer system provider liable for indirect infringement; users were direct
infringers); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
107. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007). (internal
citations omitted).
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protection. It is a dubious policy choice, however, where the online
provider is reaping a benefit from the work of others and where the
online provider may very well be the lowest cost source for monitoring
and preventing infringement.os It becomes a more suspect public
policy when coupled with requiring action only if simple measures to
prevent further damage exist.
The Seventh Circuit in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,
dealing with a different type of online service, set out a more balanced
approach to the indirect liability risk of the online provider:
Even when there are noninfringing uses of an Internet file-sharing service . .. if the
infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability as a contributory infringer the
provider of the service must show that it would have been disproportionately costly for
him to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing uses.
10 9
Whether elevated to explicit doctrine or used as a basis to set out a
reasonable care or similar standard, this suggests a more nuanced and
balanced adjustment of the interests of copyright owners and online
providers as to the obligation to find or prevent infringing conduct on
the site. It adopts the simple premise that one cannot blindly support
and facilitate ongoing damage to the property of another. While the
system discussed in Aimster differs from the search engine in Perfect
10, this simple policy premise should apply in both contexts.
This more balanced approach was also intended in § 512 of the
DMCA,110 the so-called safe harbor provisions enacted as part of the
DMCA. If a provider complies with the relevant standards of § 512,
the safe harbors exclude copyright infringement claims against it.
The most relevant safe harbor deals with the risk of liability for
infringing works posted to the provider's system by third parties.
Section 512(c) gives protection to the online provider only if the
provider does not receive a financial benefit from infringing activity it
can control (e.g., prevent) and only if:
It does not have actual knowledge of infringement or infringing activity, or
It is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, or
Upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, it acts expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material.1 1 1
Other provisions require an expeditious response to notices of
infringement received by the site from the copyright owner. 112
108. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653-54 (7th Cir. 2003) (giving discussion of cost-benefit
balancing issues in determining indirect infringement liability).
109. Id. at 653.
110. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006); see 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 6.3 (3d
ed. 2005).
111. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A).
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On its face, this does not give safe harbor protection to every
site owner who merely lacks "actual knowledge" of "specific"
infringements. There is a second, lesser standard-awareness of facts
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent. 113 This
statutory structure places some obligation on the online provider to
participate in at least attempting to reduce infringing activity on its
site. The extent to which this requires the online provider to police
the site is unclear, but it requires more than willful ignorance; the
provision requires action not only if there is actual knowledge of a
specific infringement, but also if there is awareness of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.
The difference presents a policy choice about allocating effort
and cost that is important to enforcement of a copyright in online
environments. The question is whether there should be a shared
obligation in some situations, or whether online service providers have
no obligations to prevent infringement until informed of it specifically.
In fact, there should be some obligation in some cases. The site
provider in a site with widespread infringing activity may be the
lowest cost enforcer for at least reducing obvious infringement on its
site. This may not be true where only a few, intermittent infringing
posts occur.114 The copyright owner, in contrast, always faces the task
of monitoring millions of sites and files. If an online provider has no
obligation to act unless it has knowledge of a specific infringement (or
receives specific notice), it can adopt a passive approach to controlling
infringement on its site. But that is not what the statute suggests.
Rather, the statute and appropriate policy is more consistent with the
balancing approach set out by the Seventh Circuit quoted above: "if
the infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability as a
contributory infringer the provider of the service must show that it
would have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at
least reduce substantially the infringing uses."1 15
Placing some obligation on online providers to prevent
infringement, however, conflicts with a view that would narrow
protection of informational property rights in favor of a shifting value
to others (in this case, site operators or aggregators). The district
112. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
113. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
114. Judge Posner, in the Aimster case, provides an extensive and helpful discussion of
the various factors that might be considered in the balance on whether the site operator has
some obligation to police its site for infringing conduct, balancing both the cost of the effort
involved and the degree of harm that will otherwise result to the rights holders' interests. In re
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650-54 (7th Cir. 2003).
115. Id. at 653.
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court in Viacom Int'l, Inc., v. YouTube, Inc. adopted a rights-restrictive
interpretation of § 512.116 The court held that, while it was clear to
the online operator that the YouTube site housed many infringing
copies, this was not enough to disallow the safe harbor under the
standard that the infringing activity be apparent. 117 Instead, the safe
harbor would be denied only if the online provider had actual
knowledge of a specific infringing file.118
But the statute does not say that. To be fair, the court
referenced legislative history that might support its conclusion:
Subsection (c)(1)(A)(ii) can best be described as a "red flag" test. As stated in subsection
(1), a service provider need not monitor its service or affirmatively seek facts indicating
infringing activity .. . in order to claim this limitation on liability .... However, if the
service provider becomes aware of a "red flag" from which infringing activity is
apparent, it will lose the limitation of liability if it takes no action. The "red flag" test
has both a subjective and an objective element. In determining whether the service
provider was aware of a "red flag," the subjective awareness of the service provider of
the facts or circumstances in question must be determined. However, in deciding
whether those facts or circumstances constitute a "red flag"-in other words, whether
infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under
the same or similar circumstances-an objective standard should be used.
1 19
The Viacom court interpreted this legislative history as conflating the
knowledge and the awareness standards (they both require actual
knowledge) and as requiring knowledge of a specific infringement
(rather that awareness of infringing "activity"120). But the legislative
history and the statutory language do not support this conclusion.
Just concentrate on the last sentence: The legislative history focuses
on whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a
reasonable person. 121 This standard does not require knowledge of
specific acts of infringement. In Viacom, even the district court
admitted that "[flrom plaintiffs' submissions on the motions, a jury
could find that the defendants not only were generally aware of, but
welcomed, copyright-infringing material being placed on their
website." 122
The Viacom court misapplied the statutory framework and
adopted bad policy. Many websites make important contributions to
the information age and should be protected, but many sites benefit
from widespread unauthorized use of the content of others. Especially
116. 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
117. Id. at 526.
118. Id. at 523.
119. Id. at 520-21 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44-45 (1998)).
120. Id. at 523.
121. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 44-45.
122. Viacom, 718 F.Supp.2d at 518.
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where this involves a substantial part of the site's activity, the site
should share some obligation to protect informational property rights,
so long as the effort to do so is not disproportionally costly. This is a
fair reading of the statutory safe-harbor language which requires
action even in the absence of actual knowledge of specific infringing
activity. 123
The result in Viacom can be contrasted with the result in
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung,124 which shows that a line
can be drawn other than at the level of actual knowledge of specific
infringing files in cases where infringement is ubiquitous and, in fact,
encouraged by the site operator. In that case, the defendant operated a
peer-to-peer file sharing system that involved massive amounts of
infringement (evidence suggested that over 95 percent of the
downloads may have been infringing). 125 The court found that the
defendants were inducing their users to infringe. 126 According to the
court, the operators of the site affirmatively fostered infringement by
numerous means. 127 But what if the § 512 defense that Viacom
suggests is present unless there is actual knowledge of specific
infringing files? The court in Fung concluded that § 512 is designed to
protect passive conduct and is not consistent with protecting active
conduct to encourage infringement. It did not apply here where the
defendant engaged in willful blindness. 128 The court went on to quote
Judge Posner in the Aimster case to the effect that "[t]he common
element of its safe harbors is that the service provider must do what it
can reasonably be asked to do to prevent the use of its service by
'repeat infringers.'
1 2 9
Viacom and Fung may be distinguished in that the site
provider in Viacom did respond to complaints and made some effort to
screen for some infringement, although the court's ruling was not
grounded in those facts. Also, the site operator in Fung openly
promoted infringing conduct by its users.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2006).
124. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. 06-5578, 2009 WL 6355911, at *8-10
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009).
125. Id. at *4.
126. Id. at* 11.
127. Id. at *11-14.
128. Id. at *18 ("In light of this overwhelming evidence, the only way Defendants could
have avoided knowing about their users' infringement is if they engaged in an 'ostrich-like
refusal to discover the extent to which their systems were being used to infringe copyright.' In
other words, to avoid actual knowledge of infringement, Defendants would have bad to engage in
willful blindness." (quoting In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003))).
129. Id. (quoting In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003)).
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But the fundamental issue remains-how far should a
company or individual profit or otherwise benefit from third party
misuse of the property of others without bearing a burden in law to
take proactive steps to at least reduce that activity.
II. OTHER LAW SYSTEMS
Copyright law does not and cannot exist in isolation.
Transactions involving copyrighted material typically involve
contracts. 130  License agreements are often used to establish use
restrictions on works that copyright law alone would not have
provided.131 In addition, many copyrighted works are held in secret,
invoking privacy or trade secrecy laws that limit the use of or access to
them. 132 A wide range of other laws affects the ability of copyright
owners to control the use of and access to their work. Copyright law is
simply one stitch in a fabric of law and transactional options
applicable to informational works.
Digital systems undermine the economic incentives for creative
work intended to be established under copyright law and that are
important especially for works that require substantial investment.
This leads to not only an effort by advocates of strong rights to
reinforce legal and social support for norms against copying, but also
to reach into other areas of law to find alternative means of protecting
or generating value in creative works.133
The arguments against application of these other laws to
informational works from the perspective of rights restrictors continue
the theme found in copyright law debates: Too much control given to
130. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 129 (1997); Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Rethinking Remedies at the Intersection of Intellectual Property and Contract: Toward
a Unified Body of Law, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1997).
131. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that
transaction was not a first sale because of contract terms); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Towle, supra note 76, at 169.
132. See Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1993); Aries Info.
Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 366 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); 1 NIMMER, supra
note 50, § 3:4.
133. The most visible of these ancillary bodies of law have been contract law and the
DMCA as discussed in this Article. In addition, however, there has been extensive use of civil
causes of action under federal computer crime laws dealing with unauthorized access to online
computers, see NIMMER & TOWLE, supra note 13, T 3.05, and causes of action for trespass to
chattel, grounded in unauthorized access to computer systems, see, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV-99-
7654, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003). As these developments suggest, the
shift to Internet and related forms of content distribution has in fact caused a shift of attention
to control of access as a mean of commercializing data and other content.
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the information creator or distributor might stifle innovation and
should not be permitted.134 Rights established under law other than
copyright, the argument further goes, would undermine the balance in
copyright law, which advocates for a restrictive view sometimes
describe as a "delicate balance" with narrow rights and expansive
privileges for secondary users. 135
Alternative sources of law, however, provide important support
for commercialization of informational works, potentially restoring
strength where digital systems threaten weakening of legal support.136
Many alternative sources of law exist. We discuss two. First, we
discuss the use of contracts to set terms of use for informational works
distributed in mass markets or other environments. Contracts
establish enforceable rights between the contracting parties.137 They
apportion which copyright rights are transferred and which are
withheld, allowing rights owners to optimize how their works are
placed into the market. 38 Second, we discuss the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) provisions against circumvention of devices
that control access to copyrighted works.139 The DMCA creates a legal
regime that enables copyright owners to rely on the law to enforce
technological controls they place on access to their copyrighted work,
thus moving the point of potential enforcement up to a stage before
actual copying occurs.140
In practice, the efficacy of both the DMCA restrictions and
contract terms in supporting value in copyrighted works are subject to
practical questions of enforceability and market acceptability. Access
controls or contractual use restrictions that are generally
unacceptable in the market will not long be sustainable. In addition,
if unacceptable to the broader society, they may be unenforceable in
fact. As with copyright itself, these legal regimes create important
134. See, e.g., Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 23 ("This balance [of copyright law] is
disrupted when state [contract] law is permitted to enlarge the rights of copyright proprietors at
the expense of copyright users.").
135. See e.g., Anne K. Fujita, The Great Internet Panic: How Digitization is Deforming
Copyright Law, 2 J. TECH L. & POLY 1 (1996); Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 23; Samuelson,
supra note 56; Howard Besser, Recent Changes to Copyright: Attacks Against the Public Interest,
HOWARD BESSER'S HOMEPAGE (1998), http:/Ibesser.tsoa.nyu.edulhoward/Papers/copyright99.
html.
136. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT (2001); see also Towle,
supra note 76, at 169.
137. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
138. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
139. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006).
140. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Nimmer,
supra note 82.
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rights, but also are tools to shape social and market expectations and
which shape them in turn.
A. Contracts
Contracts involve enforceable agreements that establish rights
between the contracting parties. 1 4 1  Property rights, such as those
under copyright law, establish rights in the owner that apply to all
others who deal with the property whether or not they engage in an
agreed relationship. 1 42 The two rights-creating legal regimes are
parallel. Contracts do not depend on property rights and property
rights (as compared to their transfer) ordinarily do not depend on
contracts.
As digital information systems have presented new issues to
the copyright and data industries, many rights holders have turned to
contracts with substantial, substantive terms. 143 Contracts controlling
the use and copying of informational works are common today. 144 A
license for, as compared to a sale of, a copy of an informational product
in a retail market is an ordinary occurrence.145 Contractual licenses of
access to online sites, or "access contracts,"146 as described in the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), are
141. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 2 (4th ed. 2001);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
142. See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447, 1454-55 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that copyright does
not preempt contract).
143. See MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm't. Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 957-58 (9th Cir.
2010) (computer game); Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111-12; Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., 256 Fed. App'x
515 (3d Cir. 2007); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Briceno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So.2d 176 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
144. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market
Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335 (1996); Robert P. Merges,
The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line
Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 129 (1997); David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of
Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 23 (1999) ("This balance [of copyright law] is
disrupted when state [contract] law is permitted to enlarge the rights of copyright proprietors at
the expense of copyright users."); Holly K. Towle, The Politics of Licensing Law, 36 HOUS. L. REV.
121, 161-68 (1999).
145. See, e.g., Vernor 621 F.3d at 1104-05, 1111 (enforcing license use terms in software
contract); MDY Indus., L.L.C., 629 F.3d at 942-58 (applying the DMCA to access control
measures in video-game software); Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005)
(enforcing license in game contract); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir.
1996) (enforcing contract license regarding digital database). See generally Holly K. Towle, The
Politics of Licensing Law, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 161-68 (1999).
146. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 10 2 (a)(1) (amended 2002) ("'Access
contract' means a contract to obtain by electronic means access to, or information from, an
information processing system of another person, or the equivalent of such access.").
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ubiquitous on commercial sites, although often incorporated as "terms
of use" or "terms of service" and assented to by users of the site.147
There are many reasons for the widespread (although not
universal) presence of licenses and other contracts with terms
regulating use, access to, and transfer of informational works as
compared to simple sales of copies of digital informational products.148
In some circumstances, in addition to establishing legal rights, the
contracts serve a signaling or notice function, instructing the
particular user (and the market as a whole) about what expectations
exist regarding use of the site or the content. They can help build
social norms and expectations if made explicit and visible to users;
and of course, they must be accepted in the market and in the courts.
Enforceable contract terms also have more direct legal effects
by creating a right of action independent of copyright law if the
licensee fails to conform to the agreement. 49 This is significant in a
number of ways. For example, data or other subject matter that
copyright does not protect can be covered by enforceable contract
terms limiting use.150 Similarly, uses of copyrighted works that do not
relate to the exclusive rights stated under copyright law can be
regulated by the terms of the agreement. 151 There also exists an
interactive relationship between contract and copyright. Violation of a
contractual license term granting permission to use a copyrighted
work creates both a contract claim and, if the contract term is part of
the scope of the license, a claim for infringement.15 2
147. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 408; Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp.,
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927 (E.D. Va. 2010);
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV-99-7654, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 6, 2003).
148. Indeed, some of these reasons do not deal with copyright or other rights-related
issues. Depending on the type of information product involved or the nature of the online service
provided, there may be liability risks or privacy and data protection issues to be addressed by
contract. See NIMMER & TOWLE, supra note 13, at ch. 8 (discussing various terms of service
online and their legal purpose).
149. See MDY Indus., L.L.C., 629 F.3d at 957-58; Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999); ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1455 (enforcing a shrink wrap
license).
150. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1454-55 (holding that copyright does not preempt
contract; contractual use restrictions enforceable in reference to database that was not
copyrightable).
151. See, e.g., Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding
that copyright did not preclude enforcement of contract clause limiting program use); Adobe Sys.
Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that a copy was
licensed for educational use).
152. See, e.g., MDY Indus., L.L.C., 629 F.3d at 935; Sun Microsystems, Inc., 188 F.3d at
1117, 1124 (making distinction between scope provisions and mere covenant and remanding for
determination of proper interpretation of the particular license); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Vroom,
2011] 857
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
Contractual use terms thus enable an information provider to
efficiently differentiate among markets or desired usages. For
example, a video game provider may make its game available at one
price with a use restriction to a single standalone machine and at a
different price for use interactively online, even though the game
software in both cases is the same. 153 A music or other content
provider may make its work available at one price for personal use
only with no right to make copies, or separately at a different price
with the contractual right to make and distribute fifty copies. A
software provider may transfer software with a license limiting
retransfer to educational uses only or separately for redistribution for
any and all types of uses.154 A licensee may acquire a right to make
three thousand copies of a work for its offices, tailoring the number
and cost to its actual needs. 155 The list is virtually endless. In a real
marketplace, these kinds of distinctions have obvious benefits for both
the provider and the user. Yet, none flow directly from the Copyright
Act. Contracts extended into so-called "end-user space" (whether
retail, online, or commercial) provide potentially powerful tools for
tailoring products and protection and for optimizing
commercialization. 156
Not surprisingly, because contract terms can displace copyright
defenses and limitations, at least between the two parties, advocates
of weak rights resist application of contract law restrictions, especially
to end users and in the mass-market, retail, or online environments. 5 7
Among the earliest challenges to use of contract terms in end user
contexts was the argument that no contract could be formed because
no actual negotiation of terms occurs and because of the manner in
186 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999); MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc.,
952 F.2d 769, 779 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a licensor can sue for copyright infringement for
use exceeding scope of nonexclusive license); WGN Cont'l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693
F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that exceeding a license caused infringement).
153. See MDY Industries, L.L.C., 629 F.3d at 935-36; Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422
F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
154. See Adobe Sys. Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1088 (explaining that a licensee is not an
owner of the copy licensed for educational use).
155. See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that the licensee is not an owner; making copies beyond the amount permitted by
license is not fair use even though licensee never used more than the licensed amount at the
same time).
156. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Robert W.
Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market Software License
Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335 (1996); Towle, supra note 76.
157. See David Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 23 ('This balance [of copyright law] is
disrupted when state [contract] law is permitted to enlarge the rights of copyright proprietors at
the expense of copyright users."); Rice, supra note 10.
[Vol. 13:4:825858
2011] CONTENT PROTECTION IN DIGITAL CONTEXT 859
which licensors presented the terms. 15 8 One party (the licensee)
merely receives terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and in some cases,
the terms are not seen or accepted until the product arrives at the
licensee's house or office. 159 The challenges to these contracts were
grounded in positions taken by both weak rights advocates and
persons advocating a particular view of contract law theory.160
But processes by which one party is presented terms on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis are common in contracting practice, sufficiently so
that a provision of the modern Restatement of Contracts deals with
them: The terms are enforceable if the party manifests assent to them,
presumably after an opportunity to review the terms. 161  The
framework of having the terms reviewed after an initial agreement
occurs has come to be called "layered contracting" and presupposes
that the licensee had reason to know that further terms were involved
and had the right to return the product if the terms were not
acceptable.16 2  Overall, the process corresponds to the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) concept, also embodied in common law, that
a "contract . . . may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including. . . conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of such a contract."163 Today, the reported cases broadly
support that this contract rule applies to licenses of information and to
158. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991)
(refusing to enforce license terms because the terms were presented in conflict of forms setting);
Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding that the practice of using
later terms is not as common in hardware industry); Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney,
Inc., 144 P.3d 747 (Kan. 2006) (finding that Article 2 applies; later terms not part of contract
where parties had signed agreement that did not reference those terms or their being proposed).
159. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding the contract
enforceable based on use of computer without objecting to terms); ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1455
(enforcing the license,).
160. See, e.g., JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 178-84
(6th ed. 2006) (describing "shrinkwrap" contracts in ProCD and Hill as "rolling" or "layered"
contracts because the offer "rolls" until the buyer has an opportunity to review its terms); see also
Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 491 (2002) ("[W]e contend that UCITA maintains the contextual, balanced
approach to standard terms that can be found in the paper world."); Rice, supra note 10; Towle,
supra note 76.
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981); see also W. David Slawson,
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529,
529-30 (1971) (stating that standard form contracts "account for more than ninety-nine percent
of all the contracts now made" and that their "predominance ... is the best evidence of their
necessity").
162. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453; M.A. Mortenson Co., v. Timberline Software
Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), affd, 990 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000); see also UNIF.
COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 112 cmt. 9, § 202 cmts. 4, 6 (amended 2002).
163. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (amended 2011).
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online access contracts and that layered contacts are enforceable.164
These contracts are enforceable if the terms are properly made
available and assent is properly obtained. 65 UCITA, the uniform law
whose promulgation served as a fulcrum for the attacks by those
seeking to limit contract law as applied to digital subject matter,
adopted a clarified version of common law:166
(a) A person manifests assent to a record or term if the person, acting with knowledge
of, or after having an opportunity to review the record or term or a copy of it:
(1) [signs] the record or term with intent to adopt or accept it; or
(2) intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with reason to know that
the other party or its electronic agent may infer from the conduct or statement that
the person assents to the record or term ...
(c) With respect to an opportunity to review ...
(1) A person has an opportunity to review a record or term only if it is made
available in a manner that ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable person
and permit review....
(3) If a record or term is available for review only after a person becomes obligated
to pay or begins its performance, the person has an opportunity to review only if it
has a right to a return if it rejects the record.1 6 7
If terms and transactional frameworks are drafted or structured
poorly (e.g., the person has neither knowledge nor reason to know that
terms are proposed), then no contract results.168 In addition, a few
164. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (online
contract enforced); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (shrink wrap
license was effective); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (contract
enforceable based on use of computer without objecting to terms); ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447
(enforcing a shrink wrap license); i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d
328 (D. Mass. 2002) (shrink wrap license enforceable under Article 2); Briceno v. Sprint
Spectrum, L.P., 911 So.2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (terms of cell phone agreement binding);
M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (license
enforced).
165. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 160, at 491.
166. See Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28-29 and 29 n.13 (2d Cir.
2002) (commenting that whether common law, Article 2, or UCITA applied to contract formation
issue, the same result would occur).
167. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 112 (amended 2002).
168. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 34 n.17; see also Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp.
2d 927, 937-38 (E.D. Va. 2010) (commenting that under UCITA and common law, no assent
where notice of availability and the requirement of assent to terms not reasonably given: "[Under
UCITA, individuals] are only deemed to have had an 'opportunity to review' a term if the term is
'available in a manner that ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable person,' or if the
website 'discloses the availability of the standard terms in a prominent place on the site' and
'does not take affirmative acts to prevent printing or storage of the standard terms for archival
or review purposes."' (internal citations omitted)). Assent does not require a statement or a
signature, but can involve mere conduct. See Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 403-04 (finding that
use of site suffices as assent); Hill, 105 F.3d 1147 (finding a contract enforceable based on use of
computer without objecting to terms).
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courts break from the general rule and reject the layered contract
concept where the parties exchanged standard form contract
proposals. 169 But the general enforceability of standard form contracts
in this environment is clear when the terms are properly presented for
agreement.170
A second challenge to enforcement, more closely linked to the
intellectual property rights debate, focuses on preemption by copyright
law. Section 301 of the Copyright Act provides that copyright
preempts any state law that creates rights equivalent to copyright
with respect to the subject matter of copyright. 171 Among other issues,
§ 301 generates litigation about whether general misappropriation
law can be applied to acts of copying factual material 72 and whether
state law rights of "publicity" can apply where the unauthorized use of
a person's image involves copying and distributing copies of the
image. 173
This Article, however, is concerned about preemption of
contract law. Copyright is a property-rights law focused on regulating
property rights in informational subject matter, whereas contract law
deal with rights established by agreement-an entirely different
matter. Except in cases where a pseudo-contract claim presented in
court is in fact a copyright claim, courts consistently hold that
copyright law does not generally preempt contracts. 174 The Seventh
169. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991);
Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 138 P.3d 826 (Okla. 2005) (acknowledging that different results
might apply if the case involved software, but concluding that the record was insufficient
regarding whether terms and conditions of sale were enforceable).
170. See, e.g., MDY Industries, L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm't Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir.
2010) (computer game); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (software);
Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., No. 06-4855, 2007 WL 4212693 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 2007); Register.Com,
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (database available online); Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (computer); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454
(7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing contract license regarding digital database); Briceno v. Sprint
Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (terms of a cell phone agreement
binding); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998) (computer); (cable
service).
171. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
172. See, e.g., Scranton Times LP v. Wilkes-Barre Publ'g.Co., No. 3:08-cv-2135, 2009 WL
3100963, at *4-6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2009).
173. See Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that a
under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act was not preempted by the Copyright Act; Toney's
identity is not fixed in a tangible medium of expression and there is no "work of authorship" at
issue). But see Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134 1145 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that
claim for right of publicity preempted where the essence of the claim had to do with copying a
master recording; finding an actual equivalence of rights asserted).
174. Telecom Technical Servs. Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 833 (11th Cir. 2004)
(finding claim requiring proof that defendants had violated the terms of the plaintiffs software
license for the benefit of third parties had an additional element that precluded preemption);
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Circuit in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,175 for example, dealing with a
shrinkwrap license relating to a database of telephone numbers, held
that a contract does not create rights equivalent to copyright for
purposes of preemption and that this result does not change simply
because the contract limits use of information not protected under
copyright law. 176 Property rights are rights as against the world,
while contract rights work between the contracting parties. 177 Among
the reasons that the difference is important is that a contract claim
does not withdraw the information from the public domain-it merely
establishes rights as between the contracting parties.178
The Zeidenberg opinion goes directly to the fundamental point
that leads to the conclusion that no preemption occurs: The rights
protected under the two systems are simply not equivalent. Even if a
contract deals with preventing copying or distribution, it builds rights
based on an agreement and a promise not to copy, rather than a
property right. Other courts reach the same result using what has
become known as the extra-element test: State law claims are not
preempted if they contain a qualitatively significant extra element
than required for a copyright infringement claim.179 In reference to
contracts, the extra elements, like enforceable promises and breach
thereof, abound.
Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that an "extra element"
precludes preemption of contract claim); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (shrink wrap license was effective); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996); Ross, Brovins & Oehmke, P.C. v. Lexis[Nexis, 348 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Mich. 2004)
(finding that contract breach claim for license of collection of automated legal forms was not
preempted; required extra element of existence of contract and breach of it); Architectronics, Inc.
v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (copyright did not preempt contract claim).
But see Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 436 (M.D.N.C.
2005). In Madison River Management, the plaintiffs claimed that the software licensee was
making and modifying copies not authorized by the license. Id. Although characterized as a
breach of contract claim, the plaintiffs in fact sought to enforce the same rights that exist under
copyright law; the court found that the allegedly breached contract terms prohibited no more
than unauthorized copying, distribution, or modification of copyrighted software. Id. at 863.
175. See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1454-55; see also Architectronics, Inc., 935 F. Supp. at
441 (finding that copyright did not preempt contract claim).
176. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1454-55.
177. Id. at 1454.
178. Id. at 1455 ("Everyone remains free to copy and disseminate all 3,000 telephone
books that have been incorporated into ProCD's database. Anyone can add sic codes and zip
codes. ProCD's rivals have done so .... [Whether a particular license is generous or restrictive,
a simple two-party contract ... may be enforced.").
179. See, e.g., Telecom Technical Serus. Inc., 388 F.3d at 833 (finding that the claim
requiring proof that defendants had violated the terms of the plaintiffs software license had an
additional element that precluded preemption); Grosso, 383 F.3d at 968 (finding that an "extra
element" precludes preemption of contract claim).
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A different preemption argument lies at the center of the rights
debate: that contracts (especially standard form, end-user contracts)
cannot as a matter of policy be used to alter user rights or privileges
set out in the Copyright Act.180 In regard to preemption, the argument
posits that, independent of § 301, there are principles in copyright law
that cannot be altered by contract terms, such as the doctrines of fair
use and first sale.181 The theory could also be presented under a
contract law theme that argues that these rules state fundamental
public policy that trumps the fundamental public interest in enforcing
contracts. 182 Reflecting the copyright law grounding of the overall
debate, however, it is typically presented as a preemption issue.
One branch of this argument focuses on the doctrine of fair use,
arguing that contracts cannot preclude fair use of copyrighted works.
Courts, however, routinely reject the idea that "fair use" trumps
contract terms. 183 The question is essentially one of whether fair use
privileges can be waived by agreement. The answer, as the courts
have found, must be yes. There are many fundamental rights in our
law that can be waived (e.g., the right to avoid self incrimination). 184
180. See Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 23 ('This balance [of copyright law] is disrupted
when state [contract] law is permitted to enlarge the rights of copyright proprietors at the
expense of copyright users.").
181. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that transaction
was not a first sale because of contract terms); Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th
Cir. 2005) (finding that fair use does not preclude contrary contract terms); Bowers v. Baystate
Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). This seldom-used
provision in the Restatement provides: "A promise or other term of an agreement is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the
interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against
the enforcement of such terms." Id. § 178(1) (emphasis added).
183. See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs., 422 F.3d at 639 (noting that fair use does not preclude
contrary contract terms); Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1327-28 (finding that shrink wrap license was
effective). Cf. Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006)
(commenting that making copies beyond the amount permitted by license is not fair use even
though licensee never used more than the licensed amount at the same time); Triad Sys. Corp. v.
Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995) (commenting that use outside scope of
license is not fair use).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-01, (1995). In Mezzanatto,
the Court writes: "The Ninth Circuit's analysis is directly contrary to the approach we have
taken in the context of a broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions. Rather than
deeming waiver presumptively unavailable absent some sort of express enabling clause, we
instead have adhered to the opposite presumption." Id. The Court goes on, stating: "A criminal
defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most fundamental protections
afforded by the Constitution." Id. at 201 (citing cases holding double jeopardy defense, privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, right to jury trial, right to confront one's accusers, and
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, may be waived). Finally, the Court writes: "Likewise, absent
some affirmative indication of Congress' intent to preclude waiver, we have presumed that
statutory provisions are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties." Id.
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Fair use, while important, does not rise to the level of other, more
fundamental rights such as the right to avoid self-incrimination, and
waivers of many fundamental rights are clearly valid.185
The fair use issue has been litigated regarding the right of the
owner of a copy to make copies in order to examine the copyrighted
work to discover its technical content. Case law holds that, in the
absence of contrary contractual terms, the owner of a copy of a
copyrighted work may make so-called "intermediate copies" to enable
it to examine the work in order for it to create its own, different
work.186 This process often involves what is described as "reverse
engineering"-a procedure of close examination and, often,
disassembly of a product purchased by the company seeking to
discover its secrets.187 Should contract terms be allowed to prevent
this type of fair use? The rights-restrictive view would argue "no,"
because privilege to engage in reverse engineering entails an
important aspect of the copyright law balance, especially in reference
to technical digital works.
Courts, however, enforce the contract. For example, in
Davidson & Associates v. Jung the court held that a shrinkwrap
license that barred reverse engineering was not preempted.188 The
court said simply:
Appellants contractually accepted restrictions on their ability to reverse engineer by
their agreement to the terms of the TOU [terms of use] and EULA [standard end user
license agreement]. "Private parties are free to contractually forego the limited ability
to reverse engineer a software product". . . and "a state can permit parties to contract
185. See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs., 422 F.3d at 639 (holding that fair use does not
preclude contrary contract terms).
186. See Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602-03 (9th Cir.
2000) ("[Ilntermediate copying could constitute copyright infringement even when the end
product did not itself contain copyrighted material. . . . But this copying nonetheless could be
protected as a fair use if it was 'necessary' to gain access to the functional elements of the
software itself."); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996)
("[A]lthough there has been some uncertainty as to whether reverse engineering constitutes
copyright infringement, . . . [w]e find the Sega opinion persuasive in view of the principal
purpose of copyright - the advancement of science and the arts."); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, (9th Cir. 1992).
187. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (2005) ("Discovery by 'reverse engineering'
[means] starting with the known product and working backward to find the method by which it
was developed. The acquisition of the known product must, of course, also be by a fair and honest
means, such as purchase of the item on the open market for reverse engineering to be lawful.");
see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 50, § 3:15; Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law
and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
188. 422 F.3d at 639.
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away a fair use defense or to agree not to engage in uses of copyrighted material that
are permitted by the copyright law if the contract is freely negotiated."18 9
Typically, contracts are limited in their effect to creating rights
and obligations between the contracting parties. When contractual
use terms deal with information covered by copyright (or patent),
however, they can impact third parties not privy to the agreement.
This occurs when the initial transfer under a license withholds rights
in a manner that also effectively withholds those rights from any third
party transferees. 190 In commercializing copyrighted content, this
possibility enhances the usefulness of contractual terms to the
information rights owner because it enables the rights owner to
control and differentiate distribution chains for the same content
product (e.g., educational use, consumer use, commercial use, number
of users). 91 and to control resale of digital products through both
contractual and property rights. 192 There are several ways in which
this can happen, but two are considered here.
The first concerns the scope of the license-terms of the license
that define the scope of permission for the licensee to use the
copyrighted work.193 In any particular license, there might be a
dispute about which terms comprise its scope, 194 but the concept is
clear: Conduct outside that contractually defined scope that involves
one or more of the exclusive rights under copyright law not only
breaches the license, but also infringes the copyright. 195  The
189. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325-26, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)).
190. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that a
transaction was not a first sale because of contract terms); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony
Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
191. See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 784-85 (9th Cir.
2006); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d
1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
192. See, e.g., Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107-O8; Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F.
Supp. at 212-13.
193. See generally 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW ch. 6
(2011 ed.).
194. See MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010); Sun
Microsystems, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1121.
195. See, e.g., MDY Indus., L.L.C., 629 F.3d 928; Wall Data Inc., 447 F.3d 773, 784-85
(explaining that the licensee is not the owner; making copies beyond the amount permitted by
license is not fair use even though licensee never used more than the licensed amount at the
same time); Sun Microsystems, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1121; MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-
Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 779 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that licensor can sue for
copyright infringement for use exceeding scope of nonexclusive license); WGN Cont'l Broad. Co.
v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that exceeding license caused
infringement).
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
significance of this for the licensee is that both contract and copyright
remedies are potentially available.196  The significance for third
parties is that a transfer of a copy or of license rights does not
eliminate the scope restriction.197 In general, there is no concept of
bona fide purchaser in copyright law. 198 As a result, if the transferee
uses the content outside the scope of the original license, and this use
involves one or more of the exclusive copyright rights, it is infringing.
A second circumstance where contracts regarding copyrighted
works may affect third parties involves the copyright doctrine of "first
sale."199 This doctrine has been a point of controversy between the
competing sides in the rights debates, although the appellate courts
have firmly come down on the side of rights owners and hold that
contract terms determine whether or not a first sale occurs. 200
First sale doctrine gives only limited privileges to the owner of
a copy. 201 Chief among these is the privilege to redistribute the
particular copy without permission of the copyright owner and despite
the copyright owner's exclusive right to distribute its work in copies. 202
The policy behind the first sale doctrine is that by obtaining full
market value for a copy by an outright sale of the copy, the copyright
owner's economic interests in controlling distribution of that copy are
fully satisfied.203  In effect, an unconditional sale exhausts the
196. See MDY Indus., L.L.C., 629 F.3d at 949. See generally 1 NIMMER & DODD, supra
note 193, § 6:5.
197. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010).
198. See, e.g., id.; Microsoft Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Md. 1995);
Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
199. The doctrine was originated by the Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,
210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908). It was subsequently codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117 (2006).
200. See MDY Indus., L.L.C., 629 F.3d at 935; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1108; DSC Commc'ns
Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
201. 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117.
202. Id. § 109(a).
203. See Robert H. Rotstein et al., The First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Age, 3 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH L.J. 23, 23-24 (2010) ("The overall first sale scheme 'rests on the principle that the
copyright owner is entitled to realize the full value of each copy or phonorecord upon its
disposition.' The theory is that the price charged for the initial sale of a copyrighted book will
account for the purchaser's ability to subsequently resell the book. Thus, if a book's resale value
is $5, the book's initial price point can be set $5 higher, such that a book with an initial value of
$7 can be sold for $12. The author captures the value of both the initial sale and the resale in the
initial value, and the purchaser is then free to dispose of his or her copy as the purchaser sees
fit."); see also Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 350; LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d
1364, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("It is axiomatic that the patent exhaustion doctrine, commonly
referred to as the first sale doctrine, is triggered by an unconditional sale. 'An unconditional sale
of a patented device exhausts the patentee's right to control the purchaser's use of the device
thereafter. The theory behind this rule is that in such a transaction, the patentee has bargained
for, and received, an amount equal to the full value of the goods. This exhaustion doctrine,
however, does not apply to an expressly conditional sale or license. In such a transaction, it is
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copyright owner's economic interest in distribution of that copy. The
doctrine does not give the copy owner the right to make and distribute
additional copies of the work. 204 Historically, however, coupled with a
business by many copyright owners in print and other media to sell
copies in retail markets, this privilege set the stage for active
secondary markets for some types of works, such as the market for
used books.205 The value in these secondary markets thus flows to
persons other than the content creators or initial distributors. Used
print materials, of course, differ from new print books in many ways
and the parallel markets comfortably co-exist.
With reference to digital works, however, the difference
between a "used" copy and a "new" copy in the market may be
immaterial. Both have the same physical appearance and utility. A
"used" digital copy of Avatar placed in a resale market thus may
compete directly with new copies offered in a "new" copy market. The
copyright owner may, therefore have a direct economic interest in
controlling, or at least participating in, the value created in this
"secondary" market. This is true even though the secondary market
does not involve the making of additional copies. Hence, license
agreements often preclude or limit the terms of any transfer of the
digital copy to a third party without the licensor's consent. 206 If
coupled with steps that prevent the initial transaction from
establishing a first sale, this arrangement extends the copyright
owner's rights into the "secondary" market. A predictable tension
arises. In some markets, rights owners see this as an important step
to protect their primary (original transfer) market from competition
with resellers who can make available virtually identical product, and
to glean value from the resale markets themselves. Consistent with a
weak rights approach, however, others value an unencumbered
secondary market more highly and argue that digital information
should be free from restrictions on transferability and that the
unencumbered secondary market of the print world should be
preserved in the digital world-unencumbered by copyright claims
more reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the
'use' rights conferred by the patentee."' (internal citations omitted)); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v.
C&C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1993); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
supra note 136, at 5-9 (emphasizing policy against restraints on alienation).
204. 17 U.S.C. § 109.
205. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 136, at 19.
206. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (copies licensed not
sold; transferee of licensed copy not an owner; no multiple copying involved); Adobe Systems Inc.
v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 2003 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (licensee not
an owner of the copy; resale of licensed copies prohibited).
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restricting transfer. 207 But, in the digital world, where this secondary
market competes more directly with the primary market than is true
in print markets, this is simply an argument for shifting value away
from copyright owners in a digital environment.208
Under current law, the resolution of this conflict turns on
deciding what conditions of transfer trigger first sale privileges. The
first sale privilege only applies to an "owner" of a copy. 209 Whether a
transfer conveys ownership depends on the terms of the contract. A
number of courts have held that a licensee who obtains a copy subject
to significant contractual limitations on its use is not an owner of the
copy. 210 No appellate courts have held to the contrary.211 In effect, use
restrictions in an enforceable contract indicate that the transferee did
not obtain and probably did not pay for the full economic value of the
copy.
The most recent appellate court application of this concept
occurred in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Vernor v. Autodesk Corp.212
In Vernor, the court held that a licensee is not the owner of a licensed
copy if the license: (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2)
significantly restricts the user's ability to transfer the software; and
(3) imposes notable use restrictions.213 The Court of Appeals for the
207. See, e.g., Justin Graham, Preserving the Aftermarket in Copyrighted Works:
Adapting the First Sale Doctrine to the Emerging Technological Landscape, 2002 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1, 79; John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are Software Resale
Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 15-21 (2004); Henry Sprott Long III, Comment,
Reconsidering the "Balance" of the "Digital First Sale" Debate: Re-examining the Case for a
Statutory Digital First Sale Doctrine to Facilitate Second-Hand Digital Media Markets, 59 ALA.
L. REV. 1183, 1185 (2008).
208. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Copyright First Sale and the Over-Riding Role of
Contract, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
209. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the
owner of a particular copy . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord." (emphasis added)); id. § 117
(detailing similar ownership limitation with respect to copies of computer programs).
210. See, e.g., MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm't.Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010);
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriffs
Dep't, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1998); MAI
Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886
F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989); NCR Corp. v. ATM Exch., Inc., No. 1:05CV383, 2006 WL
1401635 (S.D. Ohio May 17, 2006) (explaining that the buyer of a machine is not owner of
software where copy was licensed, but not sold to original purchaser); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One
Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
211. Cf. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
that unsolicited, free CDs delivered to a large number of recipients with labels purporting to
restrict use of the CDs in fact transferred title to the CDs where no contract was formed).
212. 621 F.3d at 1103-04.
213. Id. at 1110.
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Federal Circuit many years before had likewise held that licensees are
not owners of a copy if the license places restrictions on use that are
inconsistent with ownership of the copy. 214
It is significant that Vernor did not involve an action between
the rights-owner and its direct licensee, but rather a copyright issue
between the rights owner and a third party who had obtained copies
from the licensee and planned to resell them online. The court held
that the license did not convey ownership of the copy to the licensee. 215
As a result, the licensee could not convey ownership of the copy to the
third party and the first sale privilege to retransfer the copies did not
apply to that third party (or to the licensee).216
As these illustrations suggest, contractual terms provide
important options for rights owners and, as such, enhance the ability
to commercialize works or otherwise assert rights in them. Their use
is consistent with copyright law and policy. The policy underlying the
balance established in copyright law has always contemplated that in
practice contractual terms will shape the conditions under which
many informational works are transferred to others. 217 Contract
terms are an important adjunct to the assertion of rights by
informational content owners, both as to the persons with whom the
provider deals directly and as to retaining rights against third parties.
B. DMCA § 1201
A second body of law that illustrates the conflict between rights
restrictors and rights enhancers comes from § 1201 of the DMCA,
which deals with the right to enforce restrictions on access to
copyrighted works.218 Section 1201 has been a focal point for debate
on the scope and desired strength of rights in informational
property. 219 This section has been controversial because it establishes
214. See, e.g., DSC Commc'ns Corp., 170 F.3d at 1360; see also Stenograph L.L.C., 144
F.3d at 148; Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 367
(E.D. Va. 1994).
215. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111.
216. Id.
217. The clearest statutory illustrations of this are the reference to so-called first-sale
privileges for the owner of a copy (ownership most often being conveyed by a contract of sale, 17
U.S.C. § 109 (2006), and the statutory regulation of transfers of ownership by assignments and
exclusive licenses, 17 U.S.C. § 204. For a discussion of the range of contract law issues
surrounding the commercialization of informational property, see generally ROBERT W.
GOMULKIEWICZ ET AL.,, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND APPLICATION (2008); 1
NIMMER & DODD, supra note 193.
218. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
219. See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 702-34 (2000). One of the DMCA's exceptions is for encryption research,
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rights that go beyond the exclusive rights in traditional copyright law
and provides rights specifically tailored to the digital and online
environment in addition to traditional copyright rules. 220
The core of § 1201 is in §1201(a)(1), which precludes
circumvention of a technological device that effectively controls access
to a work protected under copyright law. 2 2 1 One violates this section
by circumventing a technological safeguard that controls access to a
copyrighted work, not by copying or violating any of the exclusive
rights created under traditional copyright law.2 2 2 Any unauthorized
copying or distribution after the circumvention is separately
actionable under general copyright law. 22 3
In addition, § 1201 contains provisions that ban trafficking in,
or producing technology, devices, or services that enable
circumvention of access control technology 224 and, in a separate
subsection, trafficking in devices or services that enable
"circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under [copyright law]
in a work or a portion thereof."225
The trafficking provisions enable rights owners who use
technological controls to take action against upstream providers of
circumvention technology, rather than focusing solely on downstream
users who use that technology to circumvent protections on their own
copy. Logistically, it is easier and more effective for rights owners to
pursue upstream distributors than downstream end users. Upstream
lawsuits present an opportunity to cut off the supply of potential
enabling technologies, while lawsuits against individual end users
may involve suing one's own customers and in any event, involve a
but the exception may arguably warp the future progress of the field. See Joseph P. Liu, The
DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501 (2003); see also
Cassandra Imfeld, Playing Fair with Fair Use? The Digital Millennium Copyright Act's Impact
on Encryption Researchers and Academicians, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 111 (2003); Samuelson, supra
note 56.
220. See Nimmer, supra note 82.
221. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) ("No person shall circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under [the Copyright Act].").
222. See MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F,3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010);
Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink
Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (requiring a reasonable relation to preventing
infringement, but not actual infringement).
223. Reflecting this, the anti-circumvention provisions contain a separate set of
infringement liability rules, distinct from the liability rules applicable to infringement of the core
copyright. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (remedies for DMCA violation), with 17 U.S.C. § 504
(remedies for infringement).
224. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
225. Id. § 1201(b)(1)(A).
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large number of lawsuits that may not be manageable by the rights
owner. Also, while some end users have the personal capability to
circumvent technological controls, many require assistance from
traffickers in circumvention technology.
The fact that Congress enacted two separate trafficking
provisions makes clear that Congress recognized a distinction between
technology that controls access to a work (i.e. access control
technology), and technology that protects or enforces copyright rights
in a work (e.g., anti-copying technology). Copyright owners, like other
property owners, have always had the right to regulate access to their
works. 226 Section 1201(a) provides a statutory enforcement tool to
protect certain types of access controls. The policy judgment
underlying this section was that merely enabling lawsuits to prevent
or collect damages for unauthorized copying or distribution may not be
enough in a digital environment where easy copying characterizes
digital systems.227 Instead, § 1201 created a right to control access
and to legally enforce that control.
The access control right reflects a strong rights approach to
informational products by providing additional support for
commercialization of digital works. Of course, not all informational
content producers will use technological controls; many will rely
instead on other aspects of their product content or marketing. In
some cases, market resistance may prevent use of this type of
technology. 228 Yet, § 1201 supports an option for content producers
and distributors, many of whom do rely on technological controls, even
if they never resort to DMCA protections.
226. The right to exclude stems from ownership of the property. DMCA adds to this basic
right, the legal right to protect the excluding devices. For a case that preceded DMCA by many
years, see Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Mgmt. Assistance Inc., No. 81-1295, 1983 WL 1130, at *1
(D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983). In this case, Management Assistance Inc. distributed operating systems
with various levels of performance related to the price charged for the license. The various
performance levels were established by limiting code in the program. The defendant developed a
system to print the code, identify the restraints, and remove them. The court found that
Management Assistance Inc. had a "reasonable probability" of finding that the defendant's
system infringed the copyrighted program by producing a direct copy of it. Id. at *1-2. See also
Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 847 (11th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that a system to defeat the scrambling signals was both direct and indirect
infringement); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
227. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 136, at 5-9.
228. For example, Digital Rights Management technologies have met with strong
negative reactions from at least some portions of the public. See Brian Braiker, Down With DRM,
NEWSWEEK, http://www.newsweek.com/2006/11/19/down-with-drm.html (last visited May 10,
2011); .Top Ten Arguments Against DRM, LEARNOUTLOUD BLOG (Nov. 18, 2006),
http://www.learnoutloud.com/contentiblog/archives/
2 006/11/the-top_10_argu.html; Ashley
Vernon, Is DRM Even Worth It? COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 09 (Nov. 2, 2009),
http:/fblogs.cornell.edulcopyrightinthedigitalage09/tag/drm.
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Since § 1201 expanded rights of copyright owners, it
predictably has been attacked from a rights-restrictive perspective. In
one of the first appellate decisions dealing with the DMCA, the Second
Circuit in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley heard a variety of
arguments that §1201 should be narrowed or declared invalid. 229 The
court rejected the arguments. Instead, it analogized the technological
controls as equivalent to the right of any property owner to place a
lock, fence, or other security device around its property and control
access to it.230 As such, the DMCA was a content neutral and fully
enforceable set of rules to augment the property rights of copyright
owners. 231
The access control rules reflect the reality that digital
technology and digital works may require other means of protection
than did paper-based works. Building and enforcing a technological
fence and then regulating access through that fence may be one of the
ways that content can be protected in digital form.
Among the issues in Corley was the typical weak rights
argument that an expansion of rights for copyright owners wrongfully
reduces users' fair use rights.232  Corley involved access controls
applied to digital copies of motion pictures.2 33 The defendants argued
that the DMCA access device wrongfully prevented them from making
fair use of the motion pictures by copying them in their digital form. 2 34
The court responded:
Appellants have provided no support for their premise that fair use of DVD movies is
constitutionally required to be made by copying the original work in its original
format... .We know of no authority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the
Copyright Act, much less the Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method
or in the identical format of the original. Although the Appellants insisted at oral
argument that they should not be relegated to a "horse and buggy" technique in making
fair use of DVD movies, the DMCA does not impose even an arguable limitation on the
opportunity to make a variety of traditional fair uses of DVD movies, such as
commenting on their content, quoting excerpts from their screenplays, and even
recording portions of the video images and sounds on film or tape by pointing a camera,
a camcorder, or a microphone at a monitor as it displays the DVD movie.235
This is a rejection of what is a repeated effort to restrict rights by
arguing that user privileges trump the rights of the copyright owner
229. 273 F.3d 429, 457 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Nimmer, supra note 82.
230. Corley, 273 F.3d at 452-53.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 458.
233. Id. at 436.
234. Id. at 459.
235. Id. at 459.
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and methods of implementing them, like the preemption argument
rejected in Davidson.236
Again, § 1201 distinguishes between technologies that control
access to a work and technologies that protect rights in copyrighted
works. As this statutory framework indicates, access control is
different from technology protection of copyright rights. Most courts
have recognized this distinction.237 A line of cases originating from the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, has blurred it. For
example, Chamberlain v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 2 3 8 an opinion
striking in its hostility to DMCA, imposed a limitation on § 1201 that
Congress did not intend and the statutory language does not support.
Chamberlain involved an alleged DMCA violation, in which a
competitor of a garage door manufacturer marketed a "universal"
garage door opener that could operate doors manufactured by the
plaintiff.2 3 9 The plaintiff contended that this system circumvented a
system in its doors that controlled access to the door opener software
(the copyrighted work) it used. 240 In a strained reading of the statute,
the court concluded that the DMCA contained an implicit element
grounded in protecting rights under copyright law: "We conclude that
17 U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits only forms of access that bear a reasonable
relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise
affords copyright owners."241 One searches the language of the DMCA
in vain for any indication that a "reasonable relation" to rights
protection is required to protect an access control technology. The
statute does distinguish between "access control" and "rights
protection," but the court's opinion overrides that distinction by
requiring that access controls be tied to rights protection.
Even though the court ultimately admitted that access control
is separate from rights protection (indeed, the statute requires this), it
apparently thought that the scope of those rights was unacceptably
broad as a matter of policy:
Were § 1201(a) to allow copyright owners to use technological measures to block all
access to their copyrighted works, it would effectively create two distinct copyright
regimes. In the first regime, the owners of a typical work protected by copyright would
236. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that fair
use does not preclude contrary contract terms).
237. See, e.g., MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 943 (9th Cir.
2010).
238. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see
also Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
239. Chamberlain Grp., Inc., 381 F.3d at 1183.
240. Id. at 1184.
241. Id. at 1202-03.
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possess only the rights enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 106, subject to the additions,
exceptions, and limitations outlined throughout the rest of the Copyright Act-notably
but not solely the fair use provisions . . . . Under the second regime . . . owners of a work
protected by both copyright and a technological measure ... would possess unlimited
rights to hold circumventors liable under § 1201(a) merely for accessing that work, even
if that access enabled only rights that the Copyright Act grants to the public.
2 4 2
Putting aside the claim that the statute would create two copyright
regimes when in fact it merely creates an option for all copyright
owners to use access controls and enjoy statutory protection if they do
so, the court's approach adopts as a matter of policy a recurrent
rights-restrictive theme, emphasizing the limited nature of copyright
rights and the dominant right of public access:
Chamberlain's proposed construction would allow copyright owners to prohibit
exclusively fair uses . . . . It would therefore allow any copyright owner, through a
combination of contractual terms and technological measures, to repeal the fair use
doctrine with respect to an individual copyrighted work -or even selected copies of that
copyrighted work. . . . Copyright law itself authorizes the public to make certain uses of
copyrighted materials. . . . What the law authorizes, Chamberlain cannot revoke.
24 3
This policy judgment, which drives the entire opinion,
resonates with the rights-restrictive argument that the copyright user
privileges should override any contractual or technological effort to
protect copyrighted works-but that premise should be rejected and
was rejected by Congress when it enacted § 1201. Indeed, § 1201(c)
underscores that copyright rights, along with fair use and other
copyright defenses, are separate from the access and rights protection
rules: "Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use,
under this title."2 44 But a §1201 claim is not a claim for copyright
infringement, whereas all of the elements mentioned in 1201(c) are
solely connected to copyright infringement claims. The section simply
means that copyright rules are not altered by the anti-circumvention
regime. Interpreting the access control provision as it is written-a
provision whose enforcement is unrelated to potential infringement of
the underlying work-would not create two copyright regimes. It
would present a choice to all copyright owners to use or not use access
control measures in digital works.
There are many other flaws in the Chamberlain opinion, 24 5 but
it is more important to note that it represents only one approach and
242. Id. at 1199-200 (emphasis added).
243. Id. at 1202.
244. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2006).
245. For example, it noted that the exercise of Congressional power must be "rational"
and that "Chamberlain's proposed construction of § 1201(a) implies that in enacting the DMCA,
Congress attempted to 'give the public appropriate access' to copyrighted works by allowing
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that other courts reject it. MDY Industries, L.L.C. v. Blizzard
Entertainment Inc., for example, involved a DMCA trafficking claim
against a company that sold software bots that enabled users to play a
popular online game automatically. 2 4 6 In MDY, the game provider
used software (called "Warden") to detect the use of bots to play the
online version of the game. The court described the technology as
follows:
Warden has two components. The first is a software module called "scan.dll," which
scans a computer's RAM prior to allowing the player to connect to WoW's servers. If
scan.dll detects that a hot is running, such as Glider, it will not allow the player to
connect and play. After Blizzard launched Warden, MDY reconfigured Glider to
circumvent scan.dll by not loading itself until after scan.dll completed its check.
Warden's second component is a "resident" component that runs periodically in the
background on a player's computer when it is connected to WoW's servers. It asks the
computer to report portions of the WoW code running in RAM, and it looks for patterns
of code associated with known bots or cheats. If it detects a hot or cheat, it boots the
player from the game, which halts the computer's copying of copyrighted code into
The fact that Warden controlled access only to the Internet version of
the game proved important.
Unlike the court in Chamberlain, the MDY court recognized
the importance of, and applied the statutory distinction between,
access control and rights protection, specifically rejecting the
Chamberlain analysis. 248 The right to enforce controls on access
comprises a new, independent form of protection (the right to prevent
circumvention of access controls) given to a copyright owner to
encourage distribution and offer protection for works distributed in
digital form. Given the statutory framework, this is clearly the only
way to properly interpret § 1201-an additional form of protection not
connected to copyright infringement.
copyright owners to deny all access to the public. Even under the substantial deference due
Congress, such a redefinition borders on the irrational." Chamberlain Grp., Inc., 381 F.3d at
1200. This refers to a mythical world in which a copyright owner markets a motion picture that
cannot be used, seen or heard (even by the purchaser of a copy). Otherwise, it is fully rational to
say that allowing copyright owners to make choices as to how to market their works will increase
public availability of those works.
246. 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010).
247. Id. at 942.
248. Id. at 950 ("While we appreciate the policy considerations expressed by the Federal
Circuit in Chamberlain, we are unable to follow its approach because it is contrary to the plain
language of the statute. In addition, the Federal Circuit failed to recognize the rationale for the
statutory construction that we have proffered. Also, its approach is based on policy concerns that
are best directed to Congress in the first instance, or for which there appear to be other reasons
that do not require such a convoluted construction of the statute's language." (emphasis added)).
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The court cited four textual differences between the access and
rights protection provisions that compelled this result.2 4 9 The most
telling is that § 1201(a)(2) prohibits the circumvention of a measure
that "effectively controls access to a work protected under this title,"2 50
whereas § 1201(b)(1) concerns a measure that "effectively protects a
right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion
thereof."25 1 The court read § 1201(b)(1)'s rule as an effort to reinforce
copyright owners' traditional exclusive rights under § 106 by granting
them an additional means to protect an existing right.252 Sections
1201(a)(1) and (a)(2) (the access control sections), however, use the
term "work protected under this title," referencing and creating a new
right.253 The court read this term "as extending a new form of
protection, i.e., the right to prevent circumvention of access controls,
broadly to . . . copyrighted works.254
The court also referred to the legislative history of the DMCA,
which confirms what is apparent on the face of the statute. Congress
intended a distinction between technology that protects rights and
technology that controls access, even if the latter "limits access to the
plain text of a work only to those with authorized access, but provides
no additional protection against copying, displaying, performing or
distributing the work . ."255 As to the Chamberlain analysis, the
court commented:
While we appreciate the policy considerations expressed by the Federal Circuit in
Chamberlain, we are unable to follow its approach because it is contrary to the plain
language of the statute. In addition ... its approach is based on policy concerns that are
best directed to Congress in the first instance, or for which there appear to be other
reasons that do not require such a convoluted construction of the statute's language.
25 6
MDY sets the right standard for when an access device is
circumvented in separating § 1201(a) from any relationship to the
risk or actuality of infringement. It also underscores a technology or
design consideration that applies when a copyright owner elects to
rely on the anti-circumvention rules to protect its digital product. The
design issue is that the access technology must "effectively control"
249. Id. at 945-46.
250. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
251. Id. § 1201(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
252. MDY Indus., L.L.C., 629 F.3d at 944-45.
253. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
254. MDYIndus., L.L.C., 629 F.3d. at 945.
255. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 12 (1998).
256. MDYIndus., L.L.C., 629 F.3d at 950 (emphasis added).
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access to the work protected.257 If all or part of the work can be
accessed outside the protective umbrella of the technology, the
copyright owner risks a court ruling that the access control is not
effective, at least as to the part outside the umbrella.
In MDY, the Warden technology restricted access solely to the
Internet-interactive features of the game (the most valuable part of
the work).258 A purchaser (licensee) of the game could access it on his
own computer without bypassing the access control technology.
Because of this, the court found no valid anti-circumvention claim as
to the literal and non-literal features of the game contained on the
media delivered to the purchaser. 259As to those elements of the work,
access was made possible by the mere purchase of the license and
delivery of the media.260 However, the interactive game was a
separately copyrightable work and Warden effectively regulated
access to it.
III. CONCLUSION
In the midst of a period of rapid technological and social
change, a conflict exists in modern law and policy between those who
favor maintaining and expanding copyright and related rights tailored
to digital contexts, and those who favor reducing rights or letting their
enforceability atrophy. This conflict permeates copyright law and also
spills over to other legal regimes that are used to augment
commercialization or control of informational works.
While many of the legal policy foundations of copyright law
focus on establishing incentives for the creation of works of authorship
and their dissemination, perhaps an even more fundamental issue is
the role that copyright law must play in shaping social norms against
copying the work of others without permission. The core of the
copyright system must hold and support the view that comprehensive
257. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). "A technological measure 'effectively controls access to a
work' if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of
information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain
access to the work." Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
258. MDYIndus., L.L.C., 629 F.3d at 952.
259. Id. at 953 ("Here, a player's purchase of the WoW game client allows access to the
game's literal elements and individual non-literal elements. Warden blocks one form of access to
these elements: the ability to access them while connected to a WoW server. However,
analogously to the situation in Lexmark, Warden leaves open the ability to access these elements
directly via the user's computer. We conclude that Warden is not an effective access control
measure with respect to WoW's literal elements and individual non-literal elements, and
therefore, that VDY does not violate § 1201(a)(2) with respect to these elements.").
260. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 528 (6th
Cir. 2004).
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copying without permission is ordinarily inappropriate. If most people
and companies think that they can freely duplicate and transfer any
digital work produced by anyone, copyright will have fundamentally
failed, and copyright incentives will be either marginalized or
eliminated. But the social function of persuading people that copying
is often inappropriate is not well served by a weak rights regime.
Court rulings, legislation, or public positions that purport to allow one
party to profit from copying the work of another as a matter of legal
right and without permission signal a world of copying as the norm.
The better social signal would convey the message that comprehensive
copying without express or implicit permission from the copyright
owner is presumptively inappropriate.
There is often a disjunction in the argument between weak and
strong rights advocates. In most cases, the ability to copy small parts
of a work for purposes of criticism, or to reproduce ideas, or facts, is
not realistically in dispute. 261 What is in dispute, however, is how to
deal with the broader more comprehensive copying on websites, across
P2P systems, cell phones, and for commercial purposes. The two sides
of the debate often approach this issue from diametric perspectives.
One side views widespread and easy copying as a valuable change in
culture for the better, while the other views it as a threat to the
economic underpinnings of important, information producing
enterprises.
Copyright law, like most areas of law, ultimately involves a
balance of interests. One point of balance concerns what types of
works are supported. Reduced or weakened rights in digital,
networked environments are conducive to low-cost works that borrow
heavily from the work of others. Weakened rights support the ability
of individuals and the service provider to "create" and post works
based largely or entirely on the work of another, under the protection
of fair use or protective interpretations of doctrines of contributory
infringement or of a statutory safe harbor. Strong rights, in contrast,
would better support works that often involve significant investments
to create or distribute them. A balance that provides sufficiently
strong protection for high-cost (often high-value) work in digital
contexts is necessary.
261. There are times, however, where small scale copying is truly at issue, such as in the
reverse engineering cases discussed earlier. See supra notes 186-189 for discussion on reverse
engineering. But more often, when arguments focus on true forms of fair use, such as copying
small parts for criticism or the like, lurking in the background is a claim for protection of a
system that would open up a protected work to wholesale copying. See, e.g., Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir. 2001).
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In copyright law, however, a second point of balancing involves
at least three interests: the creative author (and its distributor), end
users, and online facilitators (search engines or aggregators). The
latter group, of course, represents a new factor unique to the digital
era. While copyright rights debates often focus on rights owners as
compared to end users, many important issues regarding the Internet
actually impact the extent to which an online facilitator bears
obligations or risks regarding copyright infringement. Overall, weak
rights rules on the Internet not only place more control and value in
ordinary users, they also shift value from content creators to corporate
aggregators or search engines. Strong rights rules, of course, tend to
produce the opposite impact by, for example, imposing costs or taking
control away from facilitators in return for retaining value and control
for the property rights owner. Some degree of balance should be
drawn in this area, rather than simply protecting the interests of the
facilitators, if only to enhance the enforceability of rights in Internet
environments.
Copyright law, of course, does not exist as an island, but
interacts with other rules systems. As we have seen, these are
becoming increasingly important as copyright becomes unstable, and
often inadequate to protect valuable digital works. One alternative is
contract law and licensing agreements. Another involves
technological and other controls on access to digital works, online and
in digital copies. In both respects, we may be witnessing a shift in the
old copyright paradigm that thrived on the sale of tangible copies, the
broadcast of performances, and other old media arrangements. But a
transition is inevitable.
Given the continuing, rapid change of distribution systems and
of information products, there is no single, silver bullet that will
restore stability to the information industries. How we as a society
can create a structure in which adequate resources and protections
exist for high-quality and often high-cost content production is
unclear. But what is clear is that the solution will include both
adjustments inside and outside of copyright law.
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